Army Missile Program Dependent on Flawed Contractor Plan Requirements Shortfalls Could Result in Weapon "Of Little Value"
February 12, 2008

Portions of the Pentagon's Department of Operational Test and Evaluation 2003 Annual Report
April 16, 2004

POGO Opposes "Buy Now, Fix Later" Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense: Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing March 18th
March 17, 2003

Big Dreams Still Need Oversight: Missile Defense Testing and Accountability are Being Circumvented
July 16, 2002

The Department of Defense is cutting testing requirements and financial oversight of the missile defense program, one of the most technologically challenging and expensive Pentagon weapons programs ever. History has demonstrated that cutting-edge defense initiatives, lacking oversight, will lead to cost overruns and ultimately to the production of weapons that don't work. On the other hand, experience also indicates that adding independent oversight to the mix yields a winning formula. The office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has played an integral role over the years in the successes of defense programs, providing independent advice and structure in the developmental stages to pre-empt costly post-production modifications. DOT&E was elemental in bringing an end to an era of costly Defense embarrassments that included the B-1 Bomber, the C-5 Cargo Jet, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the Sergeant York Gun. And yet, according to a January 2002 defense directive issued by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the new Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is exempted from DOT&E oversight during those early stages where its contributions have meant the most. At the same time, missile defense contracts are eligible for "other transactions" status which enables them to bypass the normal procurement contract requirements in favor of virtually unregulated acquisition. Denied the security of testing requirements and financial oversight protections that have traditionally been guaranteed, the nation is in danger of buying a weapons system that doesn't work, at an alarming cost. 

Missile Defense Agency responds to the Coast Guard's SBX concerns
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December 20, 2006 

SBX-1 Operational Suitability and Viability Assessment
,
June 2, 2006 

GAO Analyst Confides to Congressman Berman that GAO Study Was Grossly Mishandled
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April 2, 2006 

CRS Report for Congress - Missile Defense: The Current Debate
, Congressional Research Service
July 19, 2005 

DoD Programs: Ballistic Missile Defense System
Pentagon, Operational Test and Evaluation 2003 Annual Report
April 16, 2004 

GAO Report: Missile Defense Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National Missile Defense Flight Test
, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
March 4, 2002 

"Missile Defense Program Direction" memorandum by Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlining reductions in testing and financial oversight at the newly-named and reorganized Missile Defense Agency
, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
January 2, 2002 

Director Operational Test and Evaluation Report in Support of National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Review
, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
August 10, 2000 

Shoot the Moon: Missile Defense Costs as Much as Apollo Program, Adam Rawnsley, Wired; Danger Room, August 4, 2011 

Government watchdogs criticize SLAMRAAM, By Michael Bruno, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 15, 2008 

Trouble for Drone-Killing Missile, By Noah Shachtman, Wired, February 12, 2008 

Flooding causes missile defense delays in Alaska: Boeing's repairs to underground control rooms to cost $38M, By Shelby Spires, Huntsville Times, March 29, 2007 

Rainy day for missile defense: Bob Moon's interview of POGO's Nick Schwellenbach, Interview By Bob Moon, Marketplace Radio, March 27, 2007 

X-band radar to play integral role in controversial system, By Bryan Martin, Kodiak Daily Mirror, October 26, 2006 

Perspectives on President's Planned Missile Defense System, , CNN, January 22, 2004