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Project on Government Oversight

Richard Barlow Resource Page

Photograph of Richard Barlow with 2 dogs

 Photo by Tim Kupsick, AP

Working as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counter-proliferation intelligence officer in the 1980s, Richard Barlow learned that top U.S. officials were allowing Pakistan to manufacture and possess nuclear weapons, and that the A.Q. Khan nuclear network was violating U.S. laws.  He also discovered that top officials were hiding these activities from Congress, since telling the truth would have legally obligated the U.S. government to cut off its overt military aid to Pakistan at a time when covert military aid was being funneled through Pakistan to Afghan jihadists in the war against the Soviets.  Barlow's response: to organize the first interagency efforts to go after the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, well before it spread nuclear weapons to Iran, North Korea and Libya.  After engineering the arrests of Khan's nuclear agents operating in the U.S. in 1987, Mr. Barlow was sent by high levels of the CIA to testify before Congress, where he revealed that certain members of the Reagan administration had been misleading Congress.  Barlow's efforts to enforce the law and tell the truth caused Congress to come within an inch of terminating aid to Pakistan.  As a result, he was persecuted as a traitor by some cold warriors in the CIA and State Department, shutting down his operations and clouding his future in the Agency. 

In 1989, Mr. Barlow left to work for the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Dick Cheney.  By this point the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, but top officials at the DoD continued to lie about Pakistan's nuclear program.  Mr. Barlow objected.  Because he merely suggested that Congress should know the truth, he became the target of one of the most vicious retaliatory smear campaigns in recent history, which ended his career as a government employee, ruined his marriage, and caused irreparable damage to his life.   

History has shown that Mr. Barlow's judgment and actions were more than sound, and that all the accusations against him were willfully falsified.  But for nearly twenty years, via a truly mind-boggling display of procedural tactics and dereliction, the Congress has failed to address either the issue of Mr. Barlow's personal fate, or the serious intelligence issues raised by his case, signaling an institutional failure of epic proportions.  This charade continues despite the efforts of dozens of powerful senators, ten congressional committees, former senior government officials, and POGO to at least compensate Mr. Barlow with modest relief.

In 1998, following seven years of congressionally directed investigations by three Inspector Generals (IGs) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a virtually unanimous bipartisan majority in Congress, along with the President of the United States, concluded that Mr. Barlow deserved to be compensated with relief.  But a bill to pay him minimal damages was blocked when the Senate Judiciary Committee, in a highly questionable move, bowed to the objections of a single Senator, John Warner (R-VA), and sent Mr. Barlowand his pro bono attorney, the Honorable Paul Warnke, on a million dollar wild goose chase in a federal claims court where the Executive Branch blocked all evidence of crimes against the Congress (in the Senate's own court case) through improper use of the president's State Secrets Privilege (SSP).  The long overdue bust of the A.Q. Khan network in 2004, which Barlow had tried to shut down 22 years ago at great personal cost, provided new impetus for justice, and last year a bipartisan majority crafted yet another amendment to provide a modest pension to Mr. Barlow, who has worked quietly as a consultant to the intelligence community for many years.  Once again, this effort was blocked by the suspicious activities of only a few anonymous Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee.  By refusing to allow the amendment to pass, the Committee is denying relief to a patriotic intelligence officer whose life has been destroyed in an apparent attempt to protect Executive Branch officials who lied to Congress and jeopardized national security.

Please explore the links below to learn more about Mr. Barlow's case.    
       

Letters and Testimony by POGO

Testimony of POGO's Danielle Brian on S. 372: The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009.

Testimony of POGO's Danielle Brian on S. 372: The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 - See more at: http://www.pogo.org/our-work/testimony/2009/wi-wp-20090611.html#sthash.dZIGRI6T.dpuf
Testimony of POGO's Danielle Brian on S. 372: The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009 - See more at: http://www.pogo.org/our-work/testimony/2009/wi-wp-20090611.html#sthash.dZIGRI6T.dpuf

Letter from POGO and Bob Gallucci to Senator Leahy (D-VT) urging the Senate Judiciary Committee to pass an amendment providing a pension to Richard Barlow, December 18, 2007.

Letter from POGO and Bob Gallucci to Senator Specter (R-PA) urging the Senate Judiciary Committee to pass an amendment providing a pension to Richard Barlow, December 17, 2007.

Testimony of POGO's Beth Daley, Senior Investigator, Before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, February 14, 2006.

Letter from POGO and Bob Gallucci to Senators Collins (R-ME) and Lieberman (D-CT) urging them to provide a pension to Richard Barlow to compensate for his improper termination and the retaliation campaign carried out against him, June 14, 2005.


Related Resources

Maloney Seeks Compensation for Wrongfully Fired WMD Intelligence Officer, Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney Press Release, June 9, 2008.

Email from Richard Barlow to various staffers from the Senate Armed Services and Judiciary Committees, sent after President Bush vetoed the first DoD Authorization Bill, to which the Armed Services Committee planned to attach Mr. Barlow's relief amendment before the Judiciary Committee blocked it.  In this email, Mr. Barlow requests that the Judiciary Committee leadership take action to attach his relief amendment to the new Authorization Bill. January 2, 2008.

Statement by Senator Specter (R-PA), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, from a Committee hearing on oversight of the Department of Justice, in which Senator Specter expressed his belief that a president should not have the "unilateral authority to reject congressional inquiries on grounds of executive privilege," nor should he be able to "bar the Congress from getting a judicial determination as to whether that executive privilege is properly invoked."  (This is exactly what the Executive Branch did to Richard Barlow and the Senate during the Senate's Congressional Reference to the Court of Federal Claims). July 24, 2007.

Amendment to the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, submitted by Senator Bingaman (D-NM), to provide pension relief to Richard Barlow, with a finding describing why this move is justified, July 12, 2007.

CRS report - National Security Whistleblowers, by Louis Fisher, December 30, 2005.

Memo and Comments from Louis Fisher, top expert on the State Secrets Privilege at the Library of Congress, to a staffer of Senator Collins (R-ME), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, explaining why the opinion in Richard Barlow's court case is invalid, November 25, 2005.    

Letter from Senator Bingaman (D-NM) to Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, requesting that the DoD grant Richard Barlow full retirement benefits, September 23, 2004. 

Letter from Richard Barlow's attorney to Senator Bingaman (D-NM) requesting congressional assistance in providing Mr. Barlow with a fair retirement plan, April 29, 2004.

Letter from Richard Barlow's attorney to Senator Bingaman (D-NM) requesting that the Senate Armed Services Committee act on Mr. Barlow's case, and raising issues of serious abuse of executive power to cover up crimes against the Congress involving WMD intelligence, December 11, 2002. 

Letter from Richard Barlow's attorney to Senators Grassley (R-IA) and Leahy (D-VT) describing how the Senate's Reference to the Court of Federal Claims was a sham for a variety of reasons.  For instance, the Court failed to follow the Senate's instructions, and basically participated in an Executive Branch cover-up, by allowing the invocation of the State Secrets Privilege to deny both the Court and the Senate all material evidence of crimes against the Congress (in what was supposed to be a fact finding mission for the Senate), and then proceeding without the evidence.  The letter also requests that the Senate Judiciary Committee take action on Mr. Barlow's private relief bill and the October 16th appeal.  This letter and all other attempts to contact the Judiciary Committee were totally ignored.  December 6, 2002. 

Letter from Richard Barlow to Senators Kennedy (D-MA), Schumer (D-NY), Leahy (D-VT) and Feinstein (D-CA) on the Senate Judiciary Committee requesting that they take action to pass his private relief bill.  A copy of this letter was also sent to Senators Shelby (R-AL), Roberts (R-KS), Hatch (R-UT), Inhofe (R-OK), Wyden (D-OR), Rockefeller (D-WV), Levin (D-MI), Specter (R-PA), Sessions (R-AL), Bingaman (D-NM), Warner (R-VA), McCain (R-AZ).  November 7, 2002.

Letter from Richard Barlow's attorney to Senators Leahy (D-VT) and Grassley (R-IA) calling their attention to the fact that the proceeding before the Court of Federal Claims was invalid and entirely unfair to Mr. Barlow.  For instance, the Defendant blocked testimony by individuals from the highest levels of the Intelligence Community supporting Barlow's view that Congress had been lied to, as well as every single piece of classified evidence.  In addition, Mr. Barlow's lawyer noted that the judge felt it was appropriate to fire federal employees accused of even threatening or allegedly "intending" to reveal classified crimes of any sort by Executive Branch officials to any member or Committee of Congress, including the Intelligence Committees.  October 28, 2002. 

Formal Appeal of Court case back to Congress, filed before the Senate Judiciary Committee, documenting the factual and legal errors that prevented Richard Barlow from receiving his day in court, and highlighting the future abuses of executive power and cooking of WMD intelligence that would likely ensue if the Senate did not address these errors.  The Judiciary Committee ignored this appeal.  (A Congressional Reference is not a typical court case.  This is an Article I court where the politically appointed judges are not appointed for life, and the court does not decide the case.  It is, by law, an "advisory, fact finding" proceeding for the deciding body, the Congress, which also serves as the court of appeal).  October 16, 2002.

Statement of Robert M. Hathaway, former congressional staffer for Rep. Solarz (D-NY) and the House Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs, before the Court of Federal Claims, testifying that at no time was the Committee informed that full information regarding Pakistan's nuclear activities (pertaining to violations of U.S. laws) was being withheld from the Committee due to "classification concerns," and that he had no recollection of Richard Barlow disclosing or threatening to disclose classified information on Pakistan's nuclear program, May 22, 2002.

Hearing on the nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in which Mr. Wolfowitz answered questions from Senator Levin (D-MI) about the retaliations of his OSD subordinates against Mr. Barlow, and expressed his lack of support for these actions. He also volunteered that he shared Richard Barlow's belief that Congress may have been misled about Pakistan's nuclear program, February 27, 2001. 

Letter from Richard Barlow to Scott Stuckey, General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, describing a national security cover-up by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Michael Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Justice Department, using the State Secrets Privilege to improperly block from the Court and the Senate all the evidence of crimes against the Congress and the related motive for actions against Mr. Barlow in the Senate's Congressional Reference to the Court of Federal Claims of Mr. Barlow's private relief bill.  He notes that the court proceeding had become impossible to win as a result, and requests that Congress address the issue and obtain the relevant classified documents.  May 22, 2000.  

S. 2774 - A bill for the relief of Richard M. Barlow of Santa Fe, New Mexico, introduced by Senator Bingaman (D-NM).  The bill, which followed seven years of investigation, was supported by a unanimous bipartisan majority led by Senators Thurmond (R-SC), Nunn (D-GA), Levin (D-MI) and Glenn (D-OH); it was also supported by President Clinton.  It was ultimately sent to its death by the Senate Judiciary Committee in Claims Court in response to the objections of a single Senator: John Warner (R-VA).  July 8, 1998.

Bingaman Seeks Compensation for Pentagon Whistleblower, July 8, 1998.

Letter from Senator Grassley (R-IA) to William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, inviting the DoD to submit its views on the proposed relief bill for Richard Barlow, April 24, 1998.

Classified and Related Information Disclosure Act, introduced by Senator Shelby (R-AL), Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which passed the Senate by a vote of 93-7, largely in response to DoD actions against Richard Barlow. The bill requires the president to inform all intelligence agency employees that they may legally disclose to the members of a congressional committee, having as its primary responsibility the oversight of a department, agency-classified information that the employee reasonably believes to provide direct and specific evidence of a violation of any law, rule or regulation; a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, a flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.  Congressional Record, March 9, 1998.

Letter from Senator Bingaman to William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, asserting that the DoD unfairly retaliated against Richard Barlow, and requesting that the DoD work toward resolving his case, July 21, 1997. 

GAO Investigation Report - Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding a Former Defense Employee.  The GAO found that the IGs (in particular the DoD IG) failed to establish that Richard Barlow had not been retaliated against.  The report also addressed legal issues pertaining to classified whistleblowing.  July 10, 1997.

Letter from former Representative Solarz (D-NY) to Senators Thurmond (R-SC) and Nunn (D-GA), noting that Richard Barlow's case should concern Congress because it raises the issue of Congress being lied to by members of the Executive Branch, and requesting that they lead the Senate Committee on Armed Services toward resolving it, August 1, 1996.

Letter from Sherman Funk, State Department Inspector General, to Donald Deline, General Counsel for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, highlighting the vicious retaliation campaign carried out by the DoD against Richard Barlow, which included stripping Mr. Barlow of his security clearance, August 15, 1995.  

Letter from Senator Thurmond (R-SC), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, to Judith Miller, DoD General Counsel, requesting that the DoD address a series of questions regarding Richard Barlow's case, April 21, 1995.

Letter from Senator Bingaman (D-NM) to William Perry, Secretary of Defense, requesting that the DoD compensate Richard Barlow, March 3, 1994.

Letter from Sherman Funk, State Department Inspector General, to Senator Bingaman (D-NM) withdrawing his approval of an investigation into Richard Barlow's case conducted by the DoD, State, and CIA IGs due to the falsification of the report by the DoD IG, December 13, 1993. 

Letter from Senator Bingaman (D-NM) to Derek Vander Schaaf, DoD Deputy Inspector, requesting a new review of the IG's investigation into Richard Barlow's allegations of whistleblower retaliation by the DoD, and suggesting that the review be conducted by new investigators, March 17, 1993.

Letter to the DoD from Senator Glenn (D-OH), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, inquiring about testimony given by DoD officials to Congress in 1989 regarding Pakistan's nuclear capability, in light of contradictory statements recently made by DCI Robert Gates, March 8, 1993.  

Background on the Pressler Amendment and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program, U.S. Senate, including testimony from Senator John Glenn (D-OH) in which he expresses the belief, shared by Mr. Barlow and many others in the CIA, that President George Bush made a false certification to Congress in 1989 under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, and that Congress had been misled about Pakistan's nuclear weapons activities under various laws, July 31, 1992.

Letter from Sherman Funk, State Department Inspector General, to Senator Bingaman (D-NM) summarizing an IG investigation that found Richard Barlow to be an outstanding and brilliant employee who became the target of retaliation for doing his job and telling the truth, July 16, 1992. 

Letter from Senator Boren (D-OK), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Murkowsi (R-AK), Vice Chairman, to Susan Crawford, DoD Inspector General, requesting more information on the IG's investigation into possible criminal activities within the Executive Branch related to nuclear proliferation, the DoD's retaliation against Richard Barlow, and the implications of that investigation for the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, October 7, 1991.  

Gates Denies Charges He Distorted Data to Suit White House Policy, by David Rogers, Wall Street Journal, in which Robert Gates, during his confirmation hearing for CIA Director, responded to questions about whether intelligence relating to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program had been politicized. He recalled that the Reagan White House told the CIA to exercise "caution" in reporting to Congress about the intelligence relating to presidential legal certifications on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. He said the CIA was warned "to be very careful about the words that were used describing the situation." October 4, 1991.

Letter from Representative Mavroules (D-MA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee, to Susan Crawford, DoD Inspector General, requesting more information on the IG's investigation into the DoD's retaliation against Richard Barlow, July 16, 1991.

Letter from Representative Solarz (D-NY), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, to Donald Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense, requesting that the DoD resolve its outstanding case with Richard Barlow and clear his record of any false or malicious allegations, April 30, 1991.

Memo by Admiral John Scott Redd, on behalf of Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Hadley, refusing to return Mr. Barlow to any position anywhere in the OSD, May 10, 1990.

Memo from Leon Kniaz, Director of Office of the Secretary of Defense Personnel and Security, to Richard Barlow informing him that his security clearance was being restored following a nine-month long "security" investigation/smear campaign run by senior political appointees under Mr. Cheney, and that "any question of your trustworthiness for access to sensitive information was resolved in a manner completely favorable to you" (i.e., confirming that all allegations against him had been fabricated), May 5, 1990.    

Office of the Secretary of Defense memo (obtained in court discovery) from Leon Kniaz, Director of OSD Personnel and Security, to Admiral John Scott Redd, Military Assistant to Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, stating in essence that OSD Personnel and Security as well as the Defense Investigative Service had officially determined that both the security and "performance" concerns leading to the suspension of Richard Barlow's clearances and his attempted firing had been fabricated, and requesting that he be placed back in his job, or some equivalent job in OSD, March 22, 1990.

Document prepared by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, chaired by Senator Glenn (D-OH), comparing contradictory testimony on the nuclear capability of Pakistan's F-16s, various dates.

Testimony by OSD officials before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, in which the officials made false statements about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities in order to effect an illegal, $1.4 billion of F-16s, August 2, 1989.


State Secrets Privilege (SSP) Documents

Prepared Statement by Richard Barlow before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability," February 13, 2008.

Sworn declaration by Richard Kerr, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (second-highest official at the CIA), stating that he provided intelligence to the President and Congress on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and efforts to illegally procure nuclear weapons technology and equipment. Unfortunately, the relevant portion of Mr. Kerr's declaration supporting Richard Barlow's view that Congress had been willfully misled by others was totally redacted using the State Secrets Privilege, even though Kerr asserted that his statement was totally unclassified.  June 3, 2002. 

Department of Justice memo stating that the State Secrets Privilege had been invoked over "all classified information which could be relevant to this case," meaning neither the Court nor the Senate could view such evidence, even though this was the Senate's own case.  It further states that "no Congressional staff member regardless of clearance shall be entitled to review" this information.  The judge in the case accepted this viewpoint and proceeded without access to the evidence.  May 28, 2002.

Sworn declaration by Gordon Oehler, National Intelligence Officer under the Director of Central Intelligence, stating his belief that senior officials misled Congress in briefings on Pakistan's nuclear program, shaping the intelligence to fit the Administration's policy toward Pakistan.  This statement was redacted under the State Secrets Privilege, even though Dr. Oehler swore it was unclassified.  May 16, 2002. 

Deposition of Sherman Funk, State Department Inspector General, supporting Richard Barlow's allegation that senior State Department officials lied to Congress about Pakistan's nuclear program.  This statement was redacted under the State Secrets Privilege, even though Mr. Funk swore it was unclassified.  September 21, 2000.

Sworn declaration by Charles Burke, Richard Barlow's supervisor at the CIA, supporting Mr. Barlow's allegation that senior CIA officials lied to Congress about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, and challenging George Tenet's invocation of the State Secrets Privilege to block all evidence of crimes against Congress from the Court and the Senate. This statement was heavily classified under the State Secrets Privilege, even though Mr. Burke swore it was unclassified. March 22, 2000.

Sworn declaration by Michael Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency, invoking the State Secrets Privilege over virtually all the evidence of crimes against the Congress in response to Mr. Barlow's discovery requests, which blocked all such evidence from both the Court and the Senate. This statement was heavily redacted and classified. February 20, 2000.

Sworn declaration by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, invoking the State Secrets Privilege over virtually all the evidence of crimes against the Congress in response to Mr. Barlow's discovery requests, which blocked all such evidence from both the Court and the Senate.  In an extraordinary and improper move for an SSP declaration, Mr. Tenet, having blocked the evidence, then personally opined to the Court that Mr. Barlow was wrong, that the Congress had not been misled by WMD intelligence officials at the CIA. (Mr. Barlow had in fact alleged a broad pattern of Congress being misled by senior policy officers, not just some intelligence officials.)  February 10, 2000.

Department of Justice memo during the court proceeding addressing one of Richard Barlow's detailed discovery requests for specific classified documents (all of which he had past official access to) that would have provided clear evidence of crimes against the Congress and the motives for DOD's actions against him, December 3, 1999.

Deposition of Michael MacMurray, Pakistan Desk Officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, admitting that he falsified congressional testimony on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.

Motion filed by the U.S. Department of Justice clarifying that its invocation of the State Secrets Privilege was intended to cover not just classified documents, but "virtually all of the classified information that could be relevant in this case," including testimony.  The judge, Eric Bruggink, allowed this clarification, proceeded without access to any such evidence--which permitted the government (the Defendant) to virtually control the proceeding--and then provided the Senate with erroneous conclusions based on pure speculation and worse.

Motion filed by the U.S. Department of Justice invoking the State Secrets Privilege to block the disclosure of classified information that would have provided evidence of crimes committed against Congress.  The judge granted this request and proceeded without access to the evidence. 


Letters of Commendation for Richard Barlow

Certificate for Exceptional Accomplishment awarded to Richard Barlow by CIA Director William Webster. 

Letter from Charles Burke, CIA Division Chief, commending Richard Barlow's work, June 14, 1990.

Letter from Jonathan Schwartz, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, commending Richard Barlow's work, June 4, 1990.

Letter from Gerald Oplinger, Office Director, Department of Defense, commending Richard Barlow's work, May 31, 1990.

Letter from Leonard Walton, Department of Treasury, commending Richard Barlow's work, May 31, 1990.

Letter from Richard Clarke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Department of State, commending Richard Barlow's work, January 22, 1988.

Letter from Abraham Sofaer, Department of State, commending Richard Barlow's work assisting President Reagan in his decision to trigger the Solarz amendment, which cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan, January 15, 1988. 

Letter from Theodore Wu, Department of Commerce, commending Richard Barlow's work, August 24, 1987.

Letter from Norman Terrell, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commending Richard Barlow's work, April 29, 1983.

Letter from Dean Rust, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commending Richard Barlow's work, February 22, 1983.

NOTE: Mr. Barlow has other classified commendations that are in possession of the CIA.


Richard Barlow in the News

A Slap in the Face, by K. Subrahmanyam, The Times of India, February 9, 2009.

Nuclear Security Imperatives, by Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, The Nation (Pakistan), June 22, 2008.

Father of the Islamic Bomb, by Mary Wiltenburg, Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 2008.

The Spider's Stratagem, The Economist, January 3, 2008.

Four Accounts Addressing Nuclear Proliferation, by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Los Angeles Times Book Review, December 23, 2007.

Deception: How the United States Secretly Helped Pakistan Build Its Nuclear Arsenal, hosted by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now!, November 19, 2007.

The Nuclear Bombshell That Never Went Off, by Jeff Stein, CQ Homeland Security, October 19, 2007.

The Man Who Knew Too Much, The Guardian, October 13, 2007.

Whistle-blower's Fight For Pension Drags On, by Lyndsey Layton, Washington Post, July 7, 2007.

'They Sold Out the World for an F-16 Sale,' by Luke Ryland, The Raw Story, April 30, 2007.

The Nuclear WalmartPanorama, BBC, November 12, 2006 (click on the link in the upper right to watch the video, or click here for a transcript).  

The Downfall of Richard M. Barlow, CQ Researcher, Volume 16, Number 12, pp. 276-277, March 31, 2006.

To Tell the Truth, by Sibel Edmonds and William Weaver, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2006.

The Most Dangerous Man in the World?, by Chris Hansen and Richard Greenberg, Dateline NBC, January 19, 2005.

Cheney Covered Up Pakistani Nuclear Proliferation, by Jason Leopold, Scoop, March 8, 2004.

Political Intelligence: What Happens When U.S. Spies Get the Goods--And the Government Won't Listen?, by Ken Silverstein and David Isenberg, Mother Jones, January/February 2002.

Fighting for His Reputation, by Barbara Ferry, Santa Fe New Mexican, October 20, 1998.

Whistle-blowers Need Stronger Protection, by Richard Reeves, Baltimore Sun, July 28, 1997.

Fun New Way to Govern America, by Jon Carroll, San Francisco Chronicle, July 23, 1997.

Let the Whistles Blow, by Brian Friel, Government Executive, July 23, 1997.

CIA Man Who Blew the Whistle on Pak Nuclear Arms Vindicated, by Chidanand Rajghatta, Indian Express, July 22, 1997.

Criticism of C.I.A. Analyst's Dismissal Bolsters a Fight for Whistle-Blower Protections, by Jeff Gerth, New York Times, July 20, 1997. 

Pakistan's Nuclear Imperatives, by General Mirza Aslam Beg, Frontier Post, February 23, 1994.

CIA Veteran Claims DOD Persecution, by Tom Sharpe, Albuquerque Journal, May 12, 1993.

On the Nuclear Edge, by Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, March 29, 1993.

A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan, by Hedrick Smith, New York Times Magazine, March 6, 1988.


Further Reading

The Nuclear Jihadist, "Chapter 13: Nuclear Ambiguity," by Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, Hachette Book Group, 2007.

Deception: Pakistan, The United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, "Chapter 9: The Winking General," and "Chapter 11: A Guest of the Revolutionary Guard," by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Walker & Company, 2007.  

America and the Islamic Bomb, "Chapter 8: A Turn of the Screw," by David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, Steerforth Press, 2007.

Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, "Chapter 2: The Bomb," by Gordon Corera, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Nuclear Weapons for Al Qaeda, by Egmont Koch, Aufbau-Verlag, 2005. (This book is about Richard Barlow and his battles with A.Q. Khan, written in German by a journalist who has covered A.Q. Khan for 25 years).

Charlie Wilson's War, "Chapter 32: A Jihad to Remember," by George Crile, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003.  Read about how Charlie Wilson's "greatest achievement in Congress" was undoing the impact of Richard Barlow’s "devastating," truthful congressional testimony (Barlow is the "brilliant young analyst" mentioned on page 479) and the arrests of A.Q. Khan's agents that Barlow engineered.  Consider the threats to international security resulting from this fateful congressional horse trading.  This chapter and the entire issue of Pakistan's nuclear program were ignored in the recent movie, Charlie Wilson's War.

Wikipedia article on Richard Barlow.

Timeline of events related to Pakistan's nuclear program and Richard Barlow, Cooperative Research History Commons.