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Wanna know why there won't be a peace dividend? ...

Almost 23 years ago, I wrote a short pamphlet, Defense Power Games.  My aim then (as it is now) was to explain why the end of the Cold War would not produce a peace dividend in the form of reduced defense budgets that were substantially lower that those averaged during America's Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Take a quick scan of Defense Power Games ... now watch this 25 minute video -- America's War Games -- (also on youtube here)  just released by Aljazeera for its People and Power segment.  The video explains why the end of the War on Terror will not, like the end of the Cold War did not, result in a peace dividend.

Santayana wrote that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it.  After watching "America's War Games,"  ask yourself two simple questions:

  1. "What has changed since the Defense Power Games pamphlet was published in 1990?"
  2. "Will the end of the War on Terror produce a dividend?"

I submit the answers are self-evident: (1) "Nothing" and (2) "No"

But one thing that has changed: Our economy is in far greater trouble today than it was in 1990, although the seeds for the current disaster were being merrily planted during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, as well as in the 1990s, not to mention the first decade of the 21st Century.  And this time around, it ought to be clear that continuing to assign grossly excessive amounts of scarce resources (capital and skilled labour) to defense spending will make America's current economic problems worse. 

So, how can we reduce the defense budget to free up the funds needed by both the private and public sectors to reinvigorate our economy?  

Clearly, President Obama's most recent budget provides no answer -- He has placed defense off limits.  Moreover, the President and Congress are clearly maneuvering to neuter the effects of the budget sequester on the Pentagon's weapons boondoggles by focusing on furloughing people, cutting back on training, reducing spare parts purchases, etc.

Over the years (since the 1970s), my colleagues and I have written extensive diagnoses of the Pentagon's institutional problems together with many recommendations about how to correct the Pentagon's dysfunctional behaviour.  Over time, our central conclusion has remained the same: It is not only possible to reduce the defense budget, but budget reductions are a necessary step in reforming the pentagon's wasteful management practices to produce a more effective military (should it be truly necessary to use it, which is usually not the case). 

Perhaps the best and most accessible summary of our views of the problems afflicting the Military - Industrial - Congressional Complex and our recommendations for correcting  them can be found in The Pentagon Labyrinth: 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It , a free ebook we jointly wrote in 2011. (a summary of it, a chapter outline, a variety of additional links is appended beneath my signature)

Chuck Spinney
Marina di Ragusa, Sicily

____________________

The Pentagon Labyrinth

It is our pleasure to announce the publication of The Pentagon Labyrinth: 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It.  This is a short pamphlet of less than 150 pages and is available at no cost in E-Book PDF format, as well as in hard copy from links on this page as well as here and here.  Included in the menu below are download links for a wide variety of supplemental/supporting information (much previously unavailable on the web) describing how notions of combat effectiveness relate to the basic building blocks of people, ideas, and hardware/technology; the nature of strategy; and the dysfunctional character of the Pentagon’s decision making procedures and the supporting role of its  accounting shambles.
Book Cover, The Pentagon Labyrinth by Winslow Wheeler
This pamphlet aims to help both newcomers and seasoned observers learn how to grapple with the problems of national defense.  Intended for readers who are frustrated with the superficial nature of the debate on national security, this handbook takes advantage of the insights of ten unique professionals, each with decades of experience in the armed services, the Pentagon bureaucracy, Congress, the intelligence community, military history, journalism and other disciplines.  The short but provocative essays will help you to:
  • identify the decay – moral, mental and physical – in America’s defenses,
  • understand the various “tribes” that run bureaucratic life in the Pentagon,
  • appreciate what too many defense journalists are not doing, but should,
  • conduct first rate national security oversight instead of second rate theater,
  • separate careerists from ethical professionals in senior military and civilian ranks,
  • learn to critique strategies, distinguishing the useful from the agenda-driven,
  • recognize the pervasive influence of money in defense decision-making,
  • unravel the budget games the Pentagon and Congress love to play,
  • understand how to sort good weapons from bad – and avoid high cost failures, and
  • reform the failed defense procurement system without changing a single law.
The handbook ends with lists of contacts, readings and Web sites carefully selected to facilitate further understanding of the above, and more.
Select press:
Download the whole book in .pdf format, or find individual essays and supplemental materials below.
  1. Why is this Handbook Necessary? Franklin C. Spinney (this essay is a variation of the Domestic Roots of Perpetual War)
  2. Penetrating the Pentagon. George Wilson
  3. Learning about Defense. Bruce I. Gudmundsson
  4. Congressional Oversight. Willing and Able or Willing to Enable? Winslow T. Wheeler
  5. Careerism. Col. GI Wilson, USMC, ret.
  6. Confused Alarms of Struggle and Flight: A Primer for Assessing Defense Strategy in the post-Iraq World. Col. Chet Richards, USAF, ret.
  7. Follow the Money. Andrew Cockburn
  8. Decoding the Defense Budget. Winslow T. Wheeler
  9. Evaluating Weapons: Sorting the Good from the Bad. Pierre M. Sprey
  10. Developing, Buying and Fielding Superior Weapon Systems. Thomas Christie
Materials Cited:
Essay #1: Why is this Handbook Necessary? Franklin C. Spinney
  1. “Genghis John.”  Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute. July 1997, pp. 42-47.
  2. Statement before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, US House or Representatives. June 4, 2002.
  3. The New QDR: The Pentagon Goes Intellectually AWOL. CounterPunch. February 2010.
  4. The JSF: One More Card in the House. Proceedings of the Naval Institute. August 2000.
  5. Defense Death Spiral, September 1998.
  6. Porkbarrels & Budgeteers: What Went Wrong with the Defense Review. September, 1997.
  7. Defense Time Bomb; Background: F-22/JSF Case Study Hypothetical Escape Option. March 1996.
  8. Three Reasons Why the ATF Should Not Be Approved for Engineering and Manufacturing Development. July 23, 1991.
  9. Defense Power Games. October 1990.
Essay #4: Congressional Oversight. Willing and Able or Willing to Enable? Winslow T. Wheeler
  1. The Week of Shame: Congress Wilts as the President Demands an Unclogged Path to War
Essay #6: Confused Alarms of Struggle and Flight: A Primer for Assessing Defense Strategy in the post-Iraq World. Col. Chet Richards (USAF, ret.)
  1. If We Can Keep It: A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration
  2. Shattering Illusions: A National Security Strategy for 2009-2017
Essay #9: Evaluating Weapons: Sorting the Good from the Bad . Pierre M. Sprey
  1. Systems Analysis Problems of Limited War
  2. M-16 Rifle Case Study
  3. Notes on Close Air Support
  4. Combat Effectiveness Considerations in Designing Close Support Fighters
  5. Coming to Grips with Effectiveness in Rifles
  6. Promise and Reality: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-To-Air Combat
  7. “Nothing’s too good for our boys!” — Why Can’t DOD give us Quality and Quantity?
  8. Comparing the Effectiveness of Air-to-Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18
  9. Small Arms Weapons Systems Analysis: A Review and Evaluation
  10. Comparing the Effectiveness of Current Tanks
  11. The Terrible Cost of Not Testing with Real Weapons, Shooting at Real Targets
  12. Today’s OT&E: Abuses and Remedies
  13. The Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria: Volume 1
Essay #10: Developing, Buying and Fielding Superior Weapon Systems. Thomas Christie
  1. Paper on Oversight from DSB Task Force on Acquisition Streamlining
Suggested Readings, Links, Organizations and Contacts

Photograph of Franklin

By: Franklin C. Spinney

Franklin Spinney retired from the Defense Department in 2003 after a military/civilian career spanning thirty-three years, twenty-six of them as a staff analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is author of Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Westview Press, 1985) and has written for many publications.

The goal of the Straus Military Reform Project is to secure far more effective military forces and much more ethical and professional military and civilian leadership at significantly lower budget levels.

We would like to thank Philip A. Straus Jr. and family for their generous support.

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