Skip to Main Content

Take Her Deep: Reforming the U.S. Silent Service

The Dutch submarine HNLMS Walrus (S 802) prepares to moor at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., Photographer: MCC Marlowe Dix
 
The Dutch submarine HNLMS Walrus (S 802) prepares to moor at Naval Station Norfolk, Va. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Marlowe P. Dix/Released)

In 1959, The U.S. Navy commissioned its final diesel-electric submarine combatant, the USS Blueback, which served until 1990. She was the last of her kind in the American Navy because of its  insistence, or some would say, dogma, that all combatant submarines must be nuclear powered. After all, diesel-electric submarines are merely surface ships that can submerge only for short periods of time. They are too slow as well, and for these reasons primarily, they are thought to be inferior to nuclear submarines. At least that's the way the U.S. Navy thinks, but I would like to suggest that this thinking is wrong. Not just wrong, actually, but expensive and unreasonable as well. Conventional submarines, especially those with the incredibly quiet and long lasting Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), are arguably an essential weapon for any modern navy, including the U.S. Navy, for reasons that follow.

Try as they might, there is no denying that conventional submarines, even old ones, and despite their lesser speed and submerged duration, have proven themselves quite capable of sinking the U.S. Navy's best and most expensive nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. I documented these defeats extensively in my second book,  but it's worth keeping in mind just how costly and numerous these incidents have been.(1)  To cite just one example, in the late 1960s the U.S. Navy decommissioned an old diesel boat from WWII, the USS Argonaut, and sold it to Canada, a country with a very small navy, thinking that a first-rate navy like the USN no longer had much need for such outdated submarines. The Canadians renamed her HMCS Rainbow, and soon put her to good use. According to author Julie Ferguson, “Rainbow earned her share of accolades and even a mention in a Russian newspaper following her 'sinking' of a U.S. carrier bound for Vietnam” in a training exercise.(2) And contrary to what the U.S. Navy wants us to believe, these sinkings, albeit only theoretical, have been happening all the time. By my count based on unclassified reports, 16 American aircraft carriers, two battleships and 10 U.S. nuclear submarines have been theoretically sunk [or, in the case of the submarines, detected] in exercises and in operations since 1966. The real number, which is obviously classified, is most certainly much higher.

Conventional submarines are less expensive, quieter, require much smaller crews, and are capable of operating in very shallow waters, and thus are often better than nuclear submarines. Now that the USN is supposed to be focusing on the shallow littoral waters as opposed to the open ocean, small conventional submarines really make sense. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy does not seem very interested in acquiring them. Instead, it likes to emphasize that its nuclear submarines are nearly impossible to find, but allies and enemies know better. When my late father flew the CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft in the early 1980s, he told me that Canadian aircrews could find both the Soviet boomers AND the American nuclear attack submarines tailing them, and that the Americans were displeased (and in denial) when they found out that their nuclear submarines were not as stealthy as they claimed.(3)

Aside from this, the late Scott Shuger, a former Naval Intelligence officer, once said  that conventional submarines offer another advantage that rarely gets mentioned: their simplicity of design, relatively speaking, makes it easier and faster for crews and captains to become expert at using them in combat. (4) The Soviets and Russians surely knew this, as Commander Richard Compton-Hall, RN, told us back in the 1980s. He said “It is a great mistake to denigrate SSKs [conventional submarines]: they will continue to be a menace for the foreseeable future and the Soviet Navy knows it.”(5)  Similarly, Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) and his military affairs adviser William S. Lind observed,

“While the 'Washington Navy' disparages diesel submarines, the fleet admirals – those commanding battle groups at sea- often say they worry less about Soviet nuclear submarines than about their conventional boats, because the latter are so small and quiet they sneak up on them undetected.”(6)

In addition, the U.S. Navy's focus on nuclear engineering at the expense of combat skills compounds the problem. British submarine officers who have served on exchange with the U.S. Navy have often commented that their American friends spend far too much time and money on nuclear engineering and not enough on seamanship and fighting the ship. Back in 2007, a senior Royal Navy submariner of my acquaintance told me about his experiences after completing a two year tour as an exchange officer with the U.S. Navy.  He was not exactly thrilled with how the U.S. Navy trains its submarine skippers.

“There is a conflict between the focus on engineering and warfare. In the USN, engineering wins. Director, Naval Reactors [the admiral in charge of nuclear engineering] is without doubt the most powerful man in the Navy. The self-regulation that they have in place, accepted by the U.S. government, and very successful is paid for by their almost religious concentration on engineering. For example the U.S. submarine Command Course (28 students four times a year) consists of four weeks in the classroom and four weeks at sea and a 9-12 week nuclear engineering course. The average U.S. officer has conducted only two sea going posts at this stage (Junior Officer tour, generally in Engineering) and a Department Head tour. [This means that the U.S. Navy produces better engineers than warriors] The UK split between engineering and warfare is completely correct and many U.S. believe that as well. I have no engineering degree, however am capable of driving a submarine far more effectively than my U.S. counterparts. Experience and not restricting your search for submarine officers to within the engineering community is the key to success. I had 10 years at sea as a warfare officer before I started the Brit “Perisher” course and there were only four of us (six month course with nine weeks in the simulator and four weeks at sea). The difference is staggering. That is not to say that there are some exceptions. My previous U.S. Commodore was a tactical genius, however in 15 rides at sea on different US submarines, I have only found two CO’s who match a Brit.”

In other words, the Royal Navy, unlike the U.S. Navy, does not focus on engineering, and as a result it has a well-established reputation for producing some of the very best submarine captains in the world. In a recent exercise between the new British nuclear submarine HMS Astute and the USS New Mexico, a new Virginia class submarine, the captain of the Astute reported that his ship was easily able to deal with the USS New Mexico: “The Americans were utterly taken aback, blown away with what they were seeing.”(7) Bear in mind that no ship is better than her crew, but it is all too common for people to praise equipment, and forget the human element. Without a well-trained and cohesive crew, the Astute and her excellent sonar would not prevail, and that is something that needs to be addressed in the U.S. Navy.

Recommendations for Reform

1. Firstly, the U.S. Navy needs to reform its training regimen for submarine commanders. The British and the Dutch produce excellent submarine captains, a fact confirmed not just by their fighting records, but by the Americans who have taken (and survived) the British and Dutch submarine command courses in recent years. The Navy should consider making arrangements for all new submarine captains to take one of these courses.

2. Secondly, in keeping with the thinking of the great military and naval thinkers, not only does the U.S. Navy need truly committed and well-trained warriors to command its submarines, it also needs to build more cohesive crews for all its ships, including submarines. The late submariner Captain Edward L. Beach wrote in his 1999 autobiography that personnel turbulence is too high, and sailors often have weak bonds to their crew and their submarine. His remedy is to implement a “home ship” concept in which personnel are specifically assigned to one ship for most of their career. This would improve cohesion, which will generally improve combat readiness, and give the Navy a better return on its considerable investment.(8)

3. Finally, As Professor Milan Vego recommended, it is high time for the U.S. Navy to get back into the business of operating conventional submarines. Simply borrowing a boat from Sweden, as it did recently to try to get a handle on the threat from AIP submarines, will not do the trick; America needs to have her own, in addition to her existing nuclear subs.(9) For starters, Chuck Spinney suggests that the Navy “buy 2 or 3 of these AIP boats and set up an experimental squadron which could be used like the Air Force used its Aggressor Squadrons (F-5s) to test the effects of asymmetric capabilities but also to evolve new tactics in free play exercises tailored to these boats and monitored by objective umpires. This would provide a great training platform and a relatively low cost operational testing/experimentation mechanism.”

The U.S. Navy has a golden opportunity to reform itself now, and be better prepared to face future threats. Status quo thinking has undermined the Navy for too long, and the changes called for will require leadership and innovation at the highest levels. Unfortunately, history has shown that the Navy will try to resist most attempts at serious reform unless or until blood is drawn in battle, but let us hope the new generation of admirals will be more sensible.

My thanks to Captain John L. Byron, USN (Ret.), Winslow T. Wheeler, Dave Foster, and Chuck Spinney for their assistance in researching this article.

PS: For more information on AIP submarines, please click here.

Notes

1. Roger Thompson Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 185-186.

2. Julie H. Ferguson Through a Canadian Periscope (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995). p. 274.

3. Colonel Bernd Horn (Ed.) Fortune Favours the Brave (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 296.

4. Scott Shuger “The Navy We Need and The One We Got” Washington Monthly, March 1989.

5. Richard Compton-Hall Sub Vs. Sub (New York: Orion Books, 1988), p. 23.

6. Gary Hart with William S. Lind America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1996), p. 94.

7. “HMS Astute arrives home from US sea trials” article on Royal Navy website, 2 March 2012.

8. Edward L. Beach Salt and Steel: Reflections of a Submariner (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 275-276.

9. Milan Vego “The Right Submarine for Lurking in the Littorals” Proceedings, June 2010.

Photo of Roger Thompson

By: Roger Thompson

Roger Thompson, MA, FRSA, is an assistant professor at Kyung Hee University, and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is the author of Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture and Brown Shoes, Black Shoes, And Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy. For more information visit www.rogerthompson.info

The goal of the Straus Military Reform Project is to secure far more effective military forces and much more ethical and professional military and civilian leadership at significantly lower budget levels.

We would like to thank Philip A. Straus Jr. and family for their generous support.

Submitted by JohnC at: December 14, 2013
The author of this did a good job with the information he had (Proceedings articles, reflections from submariner biographies). Most of these sources are dated. That said, no force planner at BuShips, OPNAV, or PEO subs will take the author's points seriously. He simply doesn't understand (or have access to) the mission requirements of the US sub force, or the operational performance limitations of SSKs, even the best AIP boats. The speed-endurance curves for diesel boats allow SSKs to be effective at some missions (choke point patrols) but fall short on many other missions profiles. If he did understand these facts, he wouldn't be relying on anecdotes and opinions to make such sweeping recommendations. Publius and Altus are clearly insiders who have spent some time on boats. It's hard to write about these topics from the outside.
Submitted by Altus Veritas at: November 11, 2013
This article requires a thorough scrub for a number of unfounded assertions. I will point at a few that immediately caught my eye. “After all, diesel-electric submarines are merely surface ships that can submerge only for short periods of time.” Uhm, ever heard of snorkels? Diesel boats can submerged and simply snorkel as necessary to recharge batteries. And AIP boats don't need to snorkel at all. “Try as they might, there is no denying that conventional submarines, even old ones, and despite their lesser speed and submerged duration, have proven themselves quite capable of sinking the U.S. Navy's best and most expensive nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers… And contrary to what the U.S. Navy wants us to believe, these sinkings, albeit only theoretical, have been happening all the time. By my count based on unclassified reports, 16 American aircraft carriers, two battleships and 10 U.S. nuclear submarines have been theoretically sunk [or, in the case of the submarines, detected] in exercises and in operations since 1966. The real number, which is obviously classified, is most certainly much higher.” This is a fallacy where the statement begs for more information. What we know is that conventional submarines have “sunk” a bunch of ships. Here are some questions that Mr. Thompson doesn’t answer: Were these in exercises? What were the limits of the exercises? What sort of constraints were on the opposing forces? What sort of advantages were given to the conventional submarines? For that matter, how about nuclear submarine results? Any reader of submarine history, such as William Anderson’s fine books about USS Nautilus remembers how much of an advantage she always had in exercises against ASW forces. If conventional submarines did this well in exercises, what about nuclear submarines? And another question: For all the ships supposedly “sunk”, how many were missed or for that matter, sank the conventional sub? And can we compare these results against nuclear submarine exercises? In short, this paragraph above, without answering these questions, is worthless. “Conventional submarines are less expensive, quieter, require much smaller crews, and are capable of operating in very shallow waters, and thus are often better than nuclear submarines. Now that the USN is supposed to be focusing on the shallow littoral waters as opposed to the open ocean, small conventional submarines really make sense.” Why? What are the shallowest waters that nuclear submarines can operate in as opposed to conventional ones? Note that the author provides no empirical proof, instead making an unsupported assertion. Milan Vego, whose Proceedings article probably inspired this sentence, made the same mistake. “Instead, [the U.S. Navy] likes to emphasize that its nuclear submarines are nearly impossible to find, but allies and enemies know better. When my late father flew the CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft in the early 1980s, he told me that Canadian aircrews could find both the Soviet boomers AND the American nuclear attack submarines tailing them, and that the Americans were displeased (and in denial) when they found out that their nuclear submarines were not as stealthy as they claimed.” Really? Is that the only reason they were in denial? Maybe they were in denial because there was no submarine there at all. How about some statistics on the number of false contacts and POSSUBs that turned out to be whales? “Aside from this, the late Scott Shuger, a former Naval Intelligence officer, once said that conventional submarines offer another advantage that rarely gets mentioned: their simplicity of design, relatively speaking, makes it easier and faster for crews and captains to become expert at using them in combat.” Strange. Certain admirals said the same things about old American S-boats before the Second World War as opposed to newer and more advanced fleet submarines. As it was, the S-boats were outclassed. But what is really more complicated about nuclear submarines? Their ventilation system? Oh, wait, conventional submarines have snorkels and diesels as well. Their combat system? Oh, wait, the average teenager operates some pretty tough computer systems that require all sorts of multitasking; they’re called video games. The engineering system? To quote a fighter pilot to Admiral Rickover, a jet engine is more complicated than a nuclear reactor will ever be. With all due respect to the late Mr. Shuger, he seems to underrate the skill and intelligence of submariners, in the U.S. Navy and other navies. “The Soviets and Russians surely knew this, as Commander Richard Compton-Hall, RN, told us back in the 1980s. He said ‘It is a great mistake to denigrate SSKs [conventional submarines]: they will continue to be a menace for the foreseeable future and the Soviet Navy knows it.’” Is that why the Russians are building Sverodvinsk class nuclear attack submarines and Dolgorukiy nuclear ballistic missile submarines? What do they do with their conventional submarines, aside from export them? “In addition, the U.S. Navy's focus on nuclear engineering at the expense of combat skills compounds the problem. British submarine officers who have served on exchange with the U.S. Navy have often commented that their American friends spend far too much time and money on nuclear engineering and not enough on seamanship and fighting the ship… ‘For example the U.S. submarine Command Course (28 students four times a year) consists of four weeks in the classroom and four weeks at sea and a 9-12 week nuclear engineering course. The average U.S. officer has conducted only two sea going posts at this stage (Junior Officer tour, generally in Engineering) and a Department Head tour. [This means that the U.S. Navy produces better engineers than warriors] The UK split between engineering and warfare is completely correct and many U.S. believe that as well. I have no engineering degree, however am capable of driving a submarine far more effectively than my U.S. counterparts. Experience and not restricting your search for submarine officers to within the engineering community is the key to success. I had 10 years at sea as a warfare officer before I started the Brit “Perisher” course and there were only four of us (six month course with nine weeks in the simulator and four weeks at sea). The difference is staggering.’” Here are some other differences. The Royal Navy can afford to take their sweet time training up their few number of officers at Perisher – they have only 11 submarines in active service! The United States has over 70! And 18 of those submarines have 2 crews, so that’s really like 90 submarines, with 90 captains and XOs. Also, the average U.S. officer going to SCC has 3 tours before they go on to command – junior officer, department head, and XO. Strange how Mr. Thompson assumed they are better engineers than warriors, because the way that normally breaks down is that 1-2 years of the junior officer tour is spent as a division officer within the engineering department. But that junior officer also is required to qualify watchstations forward and aft at the same time, and usually is standing primarily Officer of the Deck after only a year on board. Royal Navy officers usually don’t stand this on a regular basis until their second or third sea tour (about four or five years in). And those American junior officers who become department heads? Only one-third become Engineers. The others are Navigators (in charge of navigation, operations planning, communications, and IT) and Combat Systems Officers (in charge of torpedoes, tactical planning, sonars, and fire control computers). So two-thirds of those officers are very heavily involved in tactical prowess before they even reach XO, during which they have a whole ship focus. “In a recent exercise between the new British nuclear submarine HMS Astute and the USS New Mexico, a new Virginia class submarine, the captain of the Astute reported that his ship was easily able to deal with the USS New Mexico: ‘The Americans were utterly taken aback, blown away with what they were seeing.’” Did you expect the Astute captain to say something else? After the British spent 6 years constructing her and another 5 years before she did an exercise against another peer submarine? With 11 years of investment, construction, training, and working-up, did you think he was going to say, “There is something wrong with our bloody ships today?” I’d take anything he says with a grain (or full shaker) of salt. “The British and the Dutch produce excellent submarine captains, a fact confirmed not just by their fighting records, but by the Americans who have taken (and survived) the British and Dutch submarine command courses in recent years.” How come the Canadians and Australians send their guys to American SCC, then? That seems awfully unpatriotic of the Commonwealth. And come to think of it, what fighting records? Didn’t British, in World War II, sink something like 200 or 300 enemy ships for over 70 or so submarines lost, while the Americans sank something like 1300 ships for 50 submarines lost? What did the Dutch do in World War II? And if we’re talking more recently, why did the British send a nuclear submarine to the Falklands (which sank the General Belgrano) and not a conventional submarine? And why did the conventional Argentine submarines sink nothing? “Secondly, in keeping with the thinking of the great military and naval thinkers, not only does the U.S. Navy need truly committed and well-trained warriors to command its submarines, it also needs to build more cohesive crews for all its ships, including submarines. The late submariner Captain Edward L. Beach wrote in his 1999 autobiography that personnel turbulence is too high, and sailors often have weak bonds to their crew and their submarine. His remedy is to implement a “home ship” concept in which personnel are specifically assigned to one ship for most of their career. This would improve cohesion, which will generally improve combat readiness, and give the Navy a better return on its considerable investment.” This shows considerable ignorance about personnel policies in the U.S. Navy submarine force. If a 3-5 year initial voluntary enlistment on one submarine is “turbulence”, then what would be a stability? Twenty-year conscription on the same submarine? This paragraph claims there is a problem without ever proving there is one or delving into the facts of the current system. With respect to the wonderful Captain Beach, this is one idea that even his life experience didn’t support. After only 5 war patrols in World War II, sailors in American submarines were normally rotated off because their stability under combat stress and attention to detail had suffered – a fact that took entirely too long to recognize but helped stem some of the losses toward the end of the war. “Finally, As Professor Milan Vego recommended, it is high time for the U.S. Navy to get back into the business of operating conventional submarines. Simply borrowing a boat from Sweden, as it did recently to try to get a handle on the threat from AIP submarines, will not do the trick; America needs to have her own, in addition to her existing nuclear subs.” It would be only fair to quote some articles that disagreed with Vego, who is a fine historian and knows much about operational art; but not so much about submarine warfare, as his article proved. What about this article from the following year’s Proceedings? http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-06/holy-mackerel-not-again This post makes all sorts of unfounded assertions and makes conclusions that require genuine evidence, not one-sided anecdotes. Without hard evidence, the worst thing the U.S. Navy could do with the current utter lack of funds would be to waste any money on conventional submarines.
Submitted by Publius at: November 10, 2013
A number of the comments in this article are questionable. "And contrary to what the U.S. Navy wants us to believe, these sinkings, albeit only theoretical, have been happening all the time. By my count based on unclassified reports, 16 American aircraft carriers, two battleships and 10 U.S. nuclear submarines have been theoretically sunk [or, in the case of the submarines, detected] in exercises and in operations since 1966. The real number, which is obviously classified, is most certainly much higher." That's why the Navy does exercises. These "sinkings" taught valuable lessons about ASW to the surface forces and the submarine forces involved. "Conventional submarines are less expensive, quieter, require much smaller crews, and are capable of operating in very shallow waters, and thus are often better than nuclear submarines." The following Proceedings article effectively debunks this myth: http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-06/holy-mackerel-not-again "Instead, it likes to emphasize that its nuclear submarines are nearly impossible to find, but allies and enemies know better. When my late father flew the CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft in the early 1980s, he told me that Canadian aircrews could find both the Soviet boomers AND the American nuclear attack submarines tailing them, and that the Americans were displeased (and in denial) when they found out that their nuclear submarines were not as stealthy as they claimed." Or they might be in denial because there was no submarine there. Aircraft have false contacts all the time. "For example the U.S. submarine Command Course (28 students four times a year) consists of four weeks in the classroom and four weeks at sea and a 9-12 week nuclear engineering course. The average U.S. officer has conducted only two sea going posts at this stage (Junior Officer tour, generally in Engineering) and a Department Head tour. [This means that the U.S. Navy produces better engineers than warriors] The UK split between engineering and warfare is completely correct and many U.S. believe that as well. I have no engineering degree, however am capable of driving a submarine far more effectively than my U.S. counterparts." Actually, before command all U.S. submarine officers actually have three sea-tours (Division Officer, Department Head, and Executive Officer), totaling 7-9 years at sea. Normally, only about 1-2 years of the division officer tour are spent in engineering. During the department head tour, only one-third of officers actually serve as Engineers, with the other officers being Navigator/Operations Officers or Combat Systems Officers. These officers, including the Engineer, are expected to stand significant time as Officer of the Deck and qualify for Command, providing additional tactical and operational experience. "In a recent exercise between the new British nuclear submarine HMS Astute and the USS New Mexico, a new Virginia class submarine, the captain of the Astute reported that his ship was easily able to deal with the USS New Mexico." The results of this remain classified, so we only have the British CO's comments, but clearly the U.S. Navy has its own view: http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=65063 "Firstly, the U.S. Navy needs to reform its training regimen for submarine commanders. The British and the Dutch produce excellent submarine captains, a fact confirmed not just by their fighting records..." What fighting records? In World War 2, the British sank about a quarter of the number of ships sunk by U.S. submarines with a loss of almost 150% of the U.S. Navy submarine force. "The late submariner Captain Edward L. Beach wrote in his 1999 autobiography that personnel turbulence is too high, and sailors often have weak bonds to their crew and their submarine. His remedy is to implement a “home ship” concept in which personnel are specifically assigned to one ship for most of their career." With respect to the great CAPT Beach, this suggestion worked when the Navy was smaller, with a large Battle Fleet that moved from ocean to ocean. It ignores current personnel realities of the All Volunteer Force, home-porting submarines throughout the U.S. and world, and the benefits of allowing sailors to gain different experiences. First-term enlistees normally serve 3-5 years on their first submarine. Most then get out of the Navy and do other things with their lives. Those who stay in get different experiences in different AORs and promote eventually to chief petty officer. Instead of seeing only one homeport and one AOR during their career, which the homeship idea would mean, they get the opportunity to go all over the world and experience the different missions of SSNs and SSBNs. It would be unfortunate to pigeonhole a sailor to a particular ship at the very beginning of their tour. As it is, by the time sailors become chiefs, they usually have a desired homeport they wish to stay in and can provide the benefit of their experience to numerous submarines. Cohesive crews are built by healthy command climates, a good chiefs quarters, and empowered sailors. "Finally, As Professor Milan Vego recommended, it is high time for the U.S. Navy to get back into the business of operating conventional submarines. Simply borrowing a boat from Sweden, as it did recently to try to get a handle on the threat from AIP submarines, will not do the trick; America needs to have her own, in addition to her existing nuclear subs." In an era of shrinking budgets, it would be tremendously wasteful to invest in conventional submarines that don't have the range, endurance, speed, or combat systems processing of a nuclear submarine. See the Proceedings article above. The "smaller" submarines that Professor Vego calls for, would not provide any significant advantage in shallow water -- with a draft of only about ten feet less than a nuclear submarine, they would be able to operate in only a marginal space of the littorals.
Submitted by CharleyA at: November 5, 2013
While I agree that the USN should buy a few AIP boats for testing and exercise purposes, let's not forget that we have nukes because basing options for subs outside the US are limited, and nothing can beat nuclear power for endurance. And it's not a 1 for 1 exchange, meaning that it would take several conventional subs to replace one nuke sub patrol. It also does not take a conventional boat to defeat another - it requires better tactics and sensors - and practice.
Submitted by PatG at: November 2, 2013
This one of the most strategically significant and worrisome issues that you have surfaced that I think needs IMMEDIATE attention. My first reaction was its dejavu all over again, a variant of the early days os WWII when the Navy subs were badly mismanaged and suffered for months with malfunctioning torpedoes that the damn BuShips refused to believe were flawed. After the sub force got leadership and organized they were brilliant, but we will not get a chance to sort out incompetence or buy new subs or replace malfunctioning technology the next go around. We need to ight the blow torches and get after the Naval asses tomorrow! My next note is to Senator Gillibrand.
Submitted by Pistol at: October 31, 2013
I agree with your article

Leave A Comment

Nickname
Comment
Enter this word: Change