Appendix A

Washington Post Article on National Transportation Safety Board Wiring Recommendations, April 8, 1998. Article reports that NTSB urges inspection of wiring on not just Boeing 747s and 737s but also various 727s, 757s and 767s.






Appendix B

FAA Press Releases on Boeing 747 and 737 Wiring, November 26, 1997 and April 16, 1998. Proposed FAA directive on 747s calls for inspection of wiring and installation components to prevent electrical spikes or short circuits around fuel systems. Proposed FAA directive on 737s calls for installation of electricity suppressors, shielding, and separation of wires to prevent electricity jumping to fuel tank wiring.






Appendix C

Federal Aviation Administration Description of a Telephone Call from ValuJet Anonymous Whistleblower, as Reported to the National Transportation Safety Board, May 14, 1996. ValuJet maintenance worker reports electrical problems and dangerous procedures performed on the ValuJet Flight 592 DC-9 that crashed. The revelations raise questions about the NTSB's determination that oxygen canisters self-ignited.






Appendix D

Tables from a Commercial Wiring Distributor Illustrating Which Wire Types Are on Which Commercial Aircraft, 1991.






Appendix E

Minutes of A Society of Automotive Engineers Industry/Government Subcommittee Meeting, February 2, 1983. Years before the TWA 800 explosion, a Boeing official states that Boeing has had cracking problems with extruded Teflon wiring. Extruded Teflon wiring was used for low-voltage fuel tank wiring in TWA 800.






Appendix F

Letters from Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to NTSB on Raychem Corporation Wiring, July 18, 1995 and July 20, 1995.

• Boeing states they do not have safety concerns with the wires, page 2.
• Boeing notes high wire-to-wire abrasion in some Poly-X wiring, but does not blame the wire specifically. Minor deterioration on Stilan in tests noted, page 2.
• Boeing mentions there was no procedure for DOD to notify Boeing of problems not on Boeing aircraft, page 3.
• McDonnell Douglas states it believes the wires are suitable, page 2.
• McDonnell Douglas notes chafing problems with Poly-X and a service bulletin for replacement of affected wiring, page 1.
• McDonnell Douglas notes Poly-X insulation failure due to overstamping, causing a fire, but does not blame the wire specifically, page 2.
  
  

Appendix G

Navy budget document from request to Congress for funds, FY 1983. This document shows that the Navy found problems with Raychem's Poly-X.






Appendix H

National Electrical Manufacturers Association Report on Military Aircraft Wiring 1982. This report followed a NEMA study team visit to Navy repair facilities where they interviewed maintenance specialists and examined aircraft. The document includes:

• severe problems experienced by Poly-X, including frequent splitting (see especially Subsections 5.c, and 7.d, page 4).
• Subsection 1.d on page 5 notes that wire was replaced with the same kind of wire - more Poly-X.
• Problems with Raychem 55 were also discovered (see especially Section 9, page 5) by the team.

Appendix I

Navy Letter to Congress on F-14 Poly-X Wiring Problems, June 2, 1997.

• Notes that 323 F-14s had Poly-X wiring, Para.4.
• Notes that Poly-X caused maintainability and readiness problems, necessitating replacement of critical wires, sometimes with Raychem 55, Para. 3.
• Claims there is no documented F-14 safety wiring problem any more, Para. 8.

Appendix J

National Electrical Manufacturers Association - Site Visit Notes July 26, 1982.

• The document notes problems with Raychem 55 at page 5, Section 3. Naval air rework facility personnel are recorded as saying that they were directed to use Raychem 55 despite their preferring another wire.
• At page 5, Section 4 the document reports that Raychem 55 wire used for fuel tanks had corroded shielding and cracked insulation "as received" from the factory, before it had even been put on aircraft.
• At page 5, Section 2, severe problems with another Raychem wire, Stilan, are noted.
• At page 3, Section 1, a maintenance worker view of Poly-X is noted. In order to use up large stocks of Poly-X, broken Poly-X was replaced with more Poly-X.

Appendix K

Air Force Briefing on Studies of Wiring Problems in KC-135 Aircraft, Covers 1981-85.

• 800 autopilot malfunctions.
• 23% of aircraft had faulty wiring.
• Wiring unreliable, fraying, deteriorating, and overheating.
• Wiring shorts cause electrical problems.
• Over 8000 wiring defects found in a three-year period.

Appendix L

Letters from Tensolite Company, May 24, 1996 and April 15, 1997

• Letter to David Hinson, FAA, notes dangers of Raychem 55 (Mil-W-22759/34) and that it is still used, page 1.
• Cites independent studies showing new hybrid wires superior to Raychem 55, page 2.
• Letter to Ed Block, former DOD wire expert, notes Raychem 55 (BMS 13-48) found on a wide variety of aircraft including helicopters, private jets, and shorter-range commercial aircraft too, page 1.
• Calls for updating FAA standards to new performance capabilities, page 2.

Appendix M

Conversation Record, Defense Industrial Supply Center and Grumman Aerospace March 17, 1983.

• Memo notes that Grumman decided not to use Raychem 55 due to the results of toxicity tests.

Appendix N

Defense Industrial Supply Center Memo on Aircraft Electrical Wire August 31, 1982. This memo was written to halt the adoption of Raychem 55 as the preferred wiring under certain military specifications. It documents:

• problems with Raychem 55 - called “Raychem (Modified Tefzel)” on Enclosure page, and 1.b(3) on page 2,
• the high cost of Raychem 55, Section 1.b,
• cracking and crazing problems with Stilan as well as Poly-X, Section 1.b(1),
• that in 1982, 80-90% of Navy aircraft were wired with troubled Raychem Poly-X or Stilan wires, Section 1.a,
• doubts about the manufacturers product claims, Subsection 1.b(3) and Section 3,
• and suggests that procurement officials may have acted improperly at Subsection 1.c.

Appendix O

Defense Industrial Supply Center Memo on Raychem 55 [MIL-W-22759/32-35, 41-43] 1982. Another memo opposing use of Raychem 55 and the selection of sole-source wires for the relevant military specifications. It documents:

• Problems with sole-source suppliers are at Subsection 2.a.
• Raychem's termination of Stilan wire in favor of an earlier product is noted at Subsection 2.a.
• In Section 2.d "Totally acceptable" nonsole-source substitutes in one application for sole-source Raychem 55 were found to be available from a variety of suppliers at one-twentieth or less the cost of Raychem 55.
• Section 2.c challenges the manufacturers performance ratings for Raychem 55.
• Section 2.f describes the steering of a Military Specification in Air Force use towards Raychem 55 only, and that the language was removed after the lack of tests supporting this sole-source selection was challenged.