FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 8, 2000
Contact: Seth Morris or Marcus Corbin 202-347-1122

• 1981: USAF decides to develop an Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program to address a possible Soviet threat. The ATF design will focus on stealth and supersonic cruise.⁽¹⁾
• 1986: Lockheed Martin introduces their ATF prototype, the YF-22, to the USAF.⁽²⁾
• 1991: Air Force awards the Lockheed Martin-Boeing team an Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract for the F-22. ⁽³⁾
• 1991: The F-22 program reduces its planned fleet from 750 to 648. ⁽⁴⁾
• 1992: In a test flight, the F-22 prototype pitches forward and back 40 feet above the runway at Edwards Air Force Base, lands without gear down, slides 8,000 feet, and partially burns. ⁽⁵⁾
• 1994: The F-22 program decreases from 648 down to 442 aircraft. ⁽⁶⁾
• March 1997: The Pentagon's Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) reports that the Air Force's projected $48 billion budget for the F-22 will end up at $64 billion.⁽⁷⁾
• 1997: The Quadrennial Defense Review cuts the F-22 procurement to 339 aircraft.
• 1997: Planned third flight cancelled due to failure of hydraulic isolation valve, which would have precluded raising the landing gear during flight.⁽⁸⁾
• March 1999: The USAF's military acquisition chief, Lt. Gen. Gregory Martin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, acknowledges to Congress that there are potential cost increases of nearly $1 billion in the F-22 program since last year. ⁽⁹⁾
• July 1999: The House of Representatives, following action by Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-CA), eliminates procurement funding for the F-22 in the defense budget. The vote is overwhelming, 379 to 45. However, the Conference Committee restores more than half of the requested F-22 funds and shifts them into research and development.⁽¹⁰⁾
• February 2000: President Clinton requests $2.5 billion for production of 10 F-22's. It is one of the largest items in the Pentagon's $60.3 billion procurement budget.
• March 2000: The Appropriations Committee's investigators report that the decision to enter into F-22 production is premature in light of fatigue and avionics testing that is yet to be accomplished. They recommend no production funds until 2002.⁽¹¹⁾
• March 2000: GAO testifies before Congress that production should begin at no more than six aircraft, rather than ten, and that the quantity should not exceed the six to eight aircraft per year until development and initial operational test and evaluation are complete. ⁽¹²⁾
• March 2000: Philip Coyle, Director, Operational Test Evaluation at the Pentagon, states before Congress that, " ...not enough of the test program [for the F-22] has been completed to know whether or not significant development problems remain to be corrected." ⁽¹³⁾
• 2000: The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) conducted an Operational Assessment (OA) on the F-22 and identified problems with the canopy, brakes, landing gear, avionics design, environmental control system, and the missile launch detector.⁽¹⁴⁾
• May 2000: USAF grounds F-22 test-models due to cracks in the cockpit canopies and suspends F-22 testing for at least six weeks. ⁽¹⁵⁾
• May 2000: Only 15% of the F-22 testing has been accomplished, yet the Pentagon has spent $24 billion on the program since 1985. ⁽¹⁶⁾



A report critizing the F-22 aircraft by legendary aircraft designer and retired Air Force Col. Everest E. Riccioni, June 8, 2000.

---

Endnotes

1. Lockheed Martin web page: www.lmasc.lmco.com/f22/history.htm as of June 7, 2000.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. "F-22 Aircraft Program," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, Updated December 30, 1996, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., p.3.

5. Lockheed Martin web page.

6. Ibid.

7. Pentagon's Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1997.

8. Lockheed Martin web page.

9. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2000.

10. Representative Jerry Lewis (R-CA) press releases, July 22, 1999 and October 13, 1999.

11. Statement by Rep. Obey at the House Appropriations Committee markup of FY2001 Defense Appropriations Bill, May 25, 2000.

12. GAO Report: Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2001, March 2000, GAO/OCG-00-8.

13. Statement by The Honorable Philip E. Coyle, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Before The Senate Armed Services Committee AirLand Forces Subcommittee, March 22, 2000.

14. Ibid.

15. Tony Capaccio, Air Force Suspends F-22 Test Due to Cracked Canopies, San Diego Union Tribune, May 17, 2000.

16. Statement by Rep. Obey at the House Appropriations Committee markup of FY2001 Defense Appropriations Bill, May 25, 2000.

Back to POGO Main Page

---

Click here if you have inside information concerning abuse of power, mismanagement or subservience to special interests by the federal government, let POGO know.