Rep. Obey: Also, I want to get into a couple of substantive issues. The F- 22: Last year, the committee produced a provocative defense bill which challenged many of the administration's underlying assumptions on the F-22. That took guts for the subcommittee to do. They were right to do it. A year later, the committee is choosing a different path and I think we've got some serious problems with the F-22 program still.
Since 1985, the F-22 development costs have about doubled at $24 billion and the cost of that development program continue to rise rather than stabilize. It's been in development since 1991. Only 15 percent of the testing has been accomplished so far and that is a problem. And the Pentagon cost analysis suggests the F-22 production costs will be approximately $1 billion per year more than the Air Force has budgeted.
The bill ignores the fact that -- well, the bill provides enough funding for 10 aircraft, which is simply an acceptance of the administration budget request.
I think you ought to understand that there are three cautionary flags that have been raised about the wisdom of moving to that many aircraft and I want to point out what they are. The Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation testified before Congress a few months ago that over the past three years the Air Force has lost 49 flight test months or about 20 percent compared to original plans. And he said, quote, "Basically, not enough of the test program has been completed to know whether or not significant development problems remain to be corrected." He did not recommend against proceeding but he certainly raised cautionary flags.
Then this committee's own surveys and investigations team reported to the committee in March that the decision to enter into F- 22 production is premature in light of fatigue and avionics testing which is yet to be accomplished. It recommended no production funds until the year 2002.
Thirdly, the General Accounting Office recently told the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Committees that, quote, "We believe low-rate initial production should begin at no more than six aircraft, rather than the 10 in the bill, and that aircraft quantity should not exceed the six to eight aircraft per year until development and initial operational test and evaluation are complete." It recommended reducing the fiscal 2000 budget by $828 million, a reduction of four aircraft below the amount recommended by the administration and by this committee.
So it's pretty clear to me that three independent organizations have indicated that there are major problems with this program. Two of them have explicitly recommended that the production budget not be funded at the low proposed, and I wish the committee had gone along with them.
Prepared by Project On Government Oversight.
|
|
Click here if you have inside information concerning abuse of power, mismanagement or subservience to special interests by the federal government, let POGO know. |