For more than twenty years, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has worked to investigate, expose, and remedy systemic abuses of power, mismanagement, and subservience by the federal government to powerful special interests. POGO is a politically-independent non-profit government watchdog group that strives for a government that is accountable to the citizenry.

We are pleased to comment on the Subcommittee’s cost-control concerns related to the F-22 tactical fighter program. We commend the Subcommittee for its tenacious quest to obtain the financial documents from the Defense Secretary’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) that it needs to monitor the F-22 program.

Defense officials say the CAIG’s financial numbers are “predecisional material” that cannot be made public until after major program decisions have been made. We believe this to be a perversion of a healthy public decision-making process; such material should be released prior to the time decisions are made to allow open debate. There is no legitimate reason for the CAIG to withhold from Congress such information compiled in the public interest.

The F-22 Raptor, the U.S. Air Force’s highest acquisition priority, is destined to become the most expensive fighter aircraft ever - costing up to four times more than its predecessor, the F-15. Although the Air Force would prefer to rush the F-22 into production under the Congressional radar, the watchful eyes of this Subcommittee and others hopefully will avert the F-22 program’s seeming collision course with Congress’ financial cap.

We understand that a meeting of the Department of Defense’s Defense Acquisition Board has been scheduled for August 14 – a time when Congress will be in recess – to consider approval of low rate initial production of the F-22. It would be a grave mistake for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to agree to begin initial production of the F-22 until after operational testing of the aircraft is completed.

We strongly encourage this Subcommittee to remain vigilant in watching over this program.

We have several concerns:

• Exploding F-22 Costs. The number of aircraft to be produced has been cut in half as costs continue to escalate. While there is disagreement on just how much, no one -- not even the Air Force -- is predicting that the cost of the F-22 will not significantly exceed the Congressional budget limitation. So far, we’ve seen nothing to suggest that the CAIG’s estimate – $9 billion over the Congressional cap – isn’t on target. We remain skeptical of the Air Force numbers, which are $7 billion less than the CAIG’s estimate.
• The Cost Reduction Smokescreen. The Air Force is using its Production Cost Reduction Plans as a delaying tactic to hide the facts. It’s ludicrous to suggest that the F-22 program, far behind schedule and facing formidable technological challenges, will actually be able to reduce its costs by billions of dollars. This would defy the Pentagon’s longstanding weapons acquisition history. The General Accounting Office has said that the brunt of the F-22 program’s multi-billion-dollar cost reduction projections are out of the Air Force’s control. The Air Force is rushing to gain approval for low rate initial production of the F-22, which will get the program rolling downhill like the proverbial unstoppable snowball. If we find out years later that the reduction programs didn’t save money, it will be too late.
• Cost Used to Justify Under-testing. Because the F-22 program is over budget and testing is significantly behind schedule, the Air Force is cutting back on critical testing requirements. In testimony last month to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Darleen Druyun said that avionics flight testing program has been reduced to 1,530 hours from original plans of 1,970 test hours. Avionics is one of the F-22's most nettlesome technological challenges and its functionality is critical to the overall success of the F-22. Delivery delays and aircraft redesigns have cost the F-22 program 61 months of testing, according to Lee Fame, Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. Delays cost money – and put pressure on the Pentagon to take testing shortcuts.
• Operational Testing Delays. Operational testing on the F-22 is now expected to begin as late as August 2003. Operational testing ensures that when the U.S. military goes into battle, its members are equipped with weapons that work. Testing prior to operational testing is driven by science, but lacks real-world circumstances. Operational testing focuses on the battle environment and the military’s tactics and strategy, essential to ensuring effective weapons. The V-22 Osprey is a tragic example of what can happen when the Pentagon attempts to rush production of a weapon prior to correcting deficiencies identified in operational testing.

For these and other reasons, POGO encourages the Subcommittee to continue to closely monitor cost overruns and the quality of testing in the F-22 program. We believe that this Subcommittee is doing an excellent job of ensuring that the taxpayers get the most for their money, and that our military men and women go into battle with the best and most suitable weapons.

We’re trying to do our part. POGO has previously issued two reports on the F-22 and is now sponsoring a new report, “Is the Air Force Spending Itself Into Unilateral Disarmament?” by former fighter pilot and respected aircraft designer Colonel Everest Riccioni. He argues that the F-22 program ultimately will reduce the future numbers of U.S. aircraft to a dangerously low level. We’re publicly releasing the Riccioni report to the Subcommittee today, and it will be published in an upcoming issue of Proceedings, a prestigious military journal.

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