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 Government watchdogs criticize SLAMRAAM, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, By Michael Bruno, February 15, 2008.
SLAMRAAM SLAMMED: Government watchdogs in Washington have slammed the U.S. Army’s $623 million Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile after the DOD’s inspector general said the program needs to be reworked. According to a December 2007 report by the DOD IG, obtained by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), the Army needs to “rebaseline” the contract due to “contractor technical difficulties” and “increased contract costs,” stemming from thin management of the program and its dependence on contractor Raytheon’s plan.
US Army left program's oversight to Raytheon-group, Reuters, by Andrea Shalal-Esa, February 12, 2008.
Despite clear Pentagon guidelines, the U.S. Army failed to properly oversee a $623 million Raytheon Co. missile program, relying instead on the company's own inadequate plan, according to an audit by the Pentagon's inspector general released on Tuesday. As a result, the Army could not track the performance of Raytheon, which in turn led to unnecessary cost increases, said the nonprofit Project on Government Oversight, or POGO. The group released the Pentagon audit after obtaining it under a federal Freedom of Information Act request. In its audit, the Pentagon's internal watchdog agency said it had found "material internal control weaknesses" in how the Army handled the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile program. The SLAMRAAM missile program is being developed to protect U.S. ground troops from air attacks. The Pentagon's inspector general said the Army had failed to define what exactly was required from the new missile system, and did not have a detailed plan to measure technical progress. The Army eventually restructured the program due to "contractor technical difficulties" and "increased contract costs" that stemmed in large part from the Army's mismanagement of the program and its dependence on Raytheon's inadequate systems engineering management plan, POGO said. Raytheon's plan lacked criteria for the Army to review and manage progress on technical, cost and schedule goals, directly violating Pentagon rules created in February 2004. The audit said the Army had drafted its own management plan once the inspector general's audit began in 2007, but even that plan was inadequate. The audit also said that even if SLAMRAAM could fully meet all its key performance parameters, it could "still be of little value, if it cannot meet system effectiveness requirements." Further details about that point were redacted from copies of the audit. The inspector general also criticized the Pentagon's Defense Contract Management Agency for failing to live up to its own rules for oversight of programs. "As is often the case, the problem is not with the rules, but that so few people follow them," said Nick Schwellenbach, national security investigator for POGO. "The all-too-predictable result is contractor failure." For example, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not provide formal reports about a 67 percent increase in subcontractor costs to its own officials overseeing the overall SLAMRAAM program, and its informal reports lacked critical information about cost and schedule. The report also cited problems with the security of the weapon program's information technology systems.
Trouble for Drone-Killing Missile, Wired, By Noah Shachtman, February 12, 2008.
The $623 million Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) program was supposed to be the Army's first defense specifically against low-flying cruise missiles, drones, and helicopters. But weak oversight of the program means the missile is getting more and more expensive and falling behind schedule, according to a Department of Defense Inspector General's report.
Costs are up $182 million; an initial production decision has slipped to fiscal year 2010. The Army is now "in the process of rebaselining [changing the goals] and replanning the SLAMRAAM Program," notes the December 2007 report, obtained by Project on Government Oversight through the Freedom of Information Act.
The problem is that the Army's control over its SLAMRAAM contractors has been riddled with "weakness," the report says. The technical goals of the program were left fuzzy, for example. So was the systems engineering effort. The audit notes, "Planning the progression of SLAMRAAM... without having the [Army] fully defining system capability requirements, completing system engineering planning requirements... and planning to use, as directed, unapproved information assurance guidance comprise less than prudent business practices."
For what it's worth, this is the first time I've heard of trouble in the SLAMRAAM program. And, by the Pentagon's (admittedly lame) standards, the project isn't that far behind or that over budget -- yet. Plus, how bad can things be? SLAMRAAM has a name that's straight out of a 70's porno flick. And check out the badass video!
POGO Alert - Army Missile Program Dependent on Flawed Contractor Plan Requirements Shortfalls Could Result in Weapon "Of Little Value," February 12, 2008.
Flooding causes missile defense delays in Alaska: Boeing's repairs to underground control rooms to cost $38M, Huntsville Times, by Shelby Spires, March 29, 2007.
Heavy rains last June flooded underground missile defense control rooms under construction in Alaska, setting some work back more than a year just as North Korea was preparing to test new ballistic missiles, a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency confirmed Tuesday. ... "This means the missile defense system is again experiencing a costly delay," said Jennifer Porter Gore, spokeswoman for the Washington, D.C.-based Project On Government Oversight, which first reported the rain damage on its Web site last week. "Missile defense has not been proven in reality, and it is already an extremely costly program that is not near to being completed." The flooding also came as North Korea was preparing for its July 4 ballistic missile tests. "Just the sort of threat the system is being developed to intercept," Gore said. Although none of the program's 18 active missile silos or underground control rooms was damaged, she said the flooding raises questions about how well the missile defense system would work during unexpected events such as natural disasters. "These systems are not tested or proved out very well, and that's a problem - an expensive problem," Gore said. She said the Project On Government Oversight has questioned the management and schedule of the missile defense program, in part because it is developed and managed by one contractor, which can sometimes lead to cost overruns and program delays. "We also question the fact that Boeing could be responsible for the damaged silos and then got a $38 million contract to repair the work. It also will get a $7 million award fee for completing its work" on the silo fields, Gore said. "Somebody's responsible for this damage."
BMD Focus: Rain downed U.S. BMD shield, United Press International, by Martin Sieff, March 29, 2007.
If you thought the United States had a secure, state-of-the-art ballistic missile defense shield deployed around Fort Greely, Alaska, to that could have shot down any North Korean ICBM during the crisis last July, think again. Pyongyang's attempt to test fire an ambitious Taepodong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile failed and the ambitious giant rocket exploded not long after take-off. But at least it got off the ground. The much-vaunted Ground-based Midcourse Interceptors, or GBIs, around Fort Greely never even got that far. For this week, the Project on Government Oversight, or POGO -- a non-government U.S. watchdog body founded in 1981 -- reported that several of the key interceptors could never even have been launched, not because of North Korea sabotage, or sabotage by anyone else, but because of rain. The POGO report is quite extraordinary and will be quoted from at considerable length to assure our readers we are not hyping it, or exaggerating its conclusions in any way. "A significant portion of the U.S. missile defense capability was wiped out during the summer of 2006 because torrential rains caused ground-based interceptor silos to be damaged by flood waters," POGO said in a statement. "Boeing, the contractor that is at least partly responsible for failing to protect the silos, will most likely still receive an estimated $38 million to repair the silos and a $100 million no-bid contract to build more silos. Boeing would also receive a $7 million award fee added to the contract," the group said.
Rainy day for missile defense , Marketplace Radio, March 27, 2007, Bob Moon interview's POGO 's Nick Schwellenbach .
BOB MOON: Into every federal budget, a little rain must fall. In this case, about $38 million worth of rain. That's the estimated cost of repairs to seven missile silos that were under construction in Alaska last summer. ... Now, despite the flooded silos, the same construction company, Boeing, has been given another contract to build more of them. And that's got government watchdog Nick Schwellenbach at the Project on Government Oversight wondering why. "You've got to question the decision to reward them a $100 million contract to build a new missile field when the ones they were building didn't last very long. These silos are supposed to last for decades, they're not cheap. So you would think they would build these silos to withstand some rain, so hopefully these next fields will be able to deal with a little bit of rain. The Missile Defense Agency says the flooding was due to "unprecedented rainfall" that couldn't have been anticipated and the Pentagon statement clears Boeing of any fault.
Rain KO'd Interceptors During Korea Missile Tests (Updated), Danger Room (a Wired Blog), by Noah Shachtman, March 27, 2007.
Torrential rains wiped out a quarter of the U.S.' intercontinental ballistic missile interceptor silos in Ft. Greely, Alaska last summer -- right when North Korea was preparing to carry out an advanced missile launch, according to documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight. "The flooding occurred during a three-week period between the end of June and early July 2006," POGO notes, in a statement. "The flooding damaged 25% of the U.S. interceptor missiles’ launch capability. These silos house the interceptor missiles that would be used to attempt to intercept a missile aimed at the United States. No interceptors were in the flooded silos." ... POGO blames Boeing for being "at least partly responsible for failing to protect the silos" from the elements. Nevertheless, the watchdog group observes, the company "will most likely still receive an estimated $38 million to repair the silos and a $100 million no-bid contract to build more silos. Boeing would also receive a $7 million award fee added to the contract." But the larger issue at work here is: What exactly are we getting, for the $9 billion a year we're paying for missile defense? And why can't it take a little (ok, a whole bunch of) rain?
POGO Alert - The U.S. Missile Defense System - It Can't Stand the Rain; POGO Sources Report that Rainfall Has Wiped Out 25% of U.S. Missile Defense Launch Capability, March 26, 2007.
Can Costly Radar Survive in
Alaska
? CBS Evening News, December 20, 2006. Internal Correspondence: Missile Defense Agency responds to the Coast Guard’s SBX concerns.
X-band radar to play integral role in controversial system, Kodiak Daily Mirror, October 26, 2006, by Bryan Martin.
Eight months ago the monolithic radar that could pinpoint a ping-pong ball 3,000 miles away was to play a major role in the nation’s comprehensive missile defense shield. It still may, although now it sits stalled in Hawaii instead of its homeport Adak. Missile defense experts and officials all agree on the original intent of the sea-based X-band radar (SBX) — the ability to track a missile and send data back to central control in Colorado so that an unplanned target can be struck. The SBX system’s shortcomings are listed in a major independent assessment report not officially released to the public, but originally obtained by the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington, D.C., nonprofit watchdog group that oversees government spending and national defense programs.
Missile Radar Idling in Hawaii, Chicago Tribune, August 27, 2006.
HONOLULU -- The giant radar, so powerful it can tell which way a baseball is spinning 3,000 miles away and so cutting edge it has been billed as the nation's best chance at comprehensive missile defense, came to the historic port of Pearl Harbor for what was advertised as a quick stopover for minor repairs and a paint job. ... That was eight months ago.
Leaked Document: SBX-1 Operational Suitability and Viability Assessment, June 2, 2006.
Boeing to Feel Heat on Missiles: US defense system faces new scrutiny. Chicago Tribune, by Ameet Sachdev, July 6, 2006.
North Korea's testing of numerous missiles this week renews debate about the fledgling U.S. missile-defense program and whether the backbone of the system being developed by Boeing Co. can defend the country against an attack. Already feeling the heat after a series of testing failures, Chicago-based Boeing now faces increased scrutiny of two flight tests of a missile interceptor scheduled for this year. Another misfire could cost the company millions of dollars and harm its reputation. "We have a system that doesn't really work, even though they say there's some initial capability," said Nick Schwellenbach, an investigator at the Project on Government Oversight in Washington.
The following links are related to the report of Government Accountability Office analyst Subrata Ghoshroy concerning the GAO’s actions that led to a severely watered down study of a missile defense system produced by Boeing and TRW. April 2006.
Congressional Research Service Report – Missile Defense: The Current Debate, published
July 19, 2005.
"U.S. Missile Defense Needs System Trials, Tester Says," Bloomberg.com, November 2, 2004.
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) portion of the Pentagon's Department of Operational Test and Evaluation 2003 Annual Report. The Pentagon used to make this report publicly available on the web, but is no longer doing so. POGO has scanned in the reports of eleven of the biggest or most troubled systems. April 16, 2004.
"Perspectives on President's Planned Missile Defense System," CNN, January 22, 2004.
President Bush made no mention of it in his State of the Union address earlier this week, but he has asked the Pentagon to begin putting in place the first stages of a U.S.-based missile defense system as soon as September.
POGO Letter to House Armed Services Committee on 2004 Defense Authorization. Transparency and financial accountability are threatened by several proposals in the Pentagon budget. May 2, 2003.
POGO Alert - POGO Opposes "Buy Now, Fix Later" Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense Misguided. The Pentagon seeks to waive testing requirements on the most technologically challenging weapons system ever built. Find out why POGO opposes this flawed approach.March 17, 2003.
POGO Letter to Senate Committee on Armed Services
regarding the circumventing of operational testing and financial accountability of the nation's missile defense program. March 17, 2003.
Big Dreams Still Need Oversight: Missile Defense Testing and Financial Accountability Are Being Circumvented. A sweeping reorganization of the U.S. Missile Defense program will reduce critical testing and financial oversight. POGO report released July 16, 2002.
Testimony of Eric Miller, POGO's Senior Defense Investigator, given before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran's Affairs, and International Relations, July 16, 2002.
"Missile Defense Program Direction" memorandum by Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlining reductions in testing and financial oversight at the newly-named and reorganized Missile Defense Agency, January 2, 2002.
<Rep. Ed Markey's (D-MA) Press Release, Study Finds Early Missile Defense Test Did Not Perform As Claimed, March 4, 2002.
GAO Report: Missile Defense Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National Missile Defense Flight Test, published March 4, 2002.
GAO Report: Missile Defense Review of Allegations about an Early National Missile Defense Flight Test, published March 4, 2002.
An analysis of the report by the Special Investigations Division of the Committee on Government Reform, prepared for prepared for John F. Tierney, The Coyle Report: A Comprehensive Pentagon Study Criticizing the National Missile Defense Test Program, June 26, 2001.
The report titled, Director Operational Test and Evaluation Report in Support of National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Review, August 10, 2000.
Do you have information about waste or fraud in the missile defense program?
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