The Guards: Under-manned, Under-equipped, Under-trained,The utilities running the nuclear power plants are businesses primarily focused on the bottom line of profitability. Security expenditures are drains on those profits, and as a result seem to take a back seat. Out of the 13 plants POGO investigated, only three had guards who were confident they could defeat a terrorist attack. One guard stated, in response to questions about the quality of security at his plant, "The NEI is fooling the public, which is outrageous."On the one hand, it appears that the plants with the best security have a common thread - security improves when utilities hire security managers with military backgrounds in physical security, and support them with an adequate number of guards, training, and weaponry.On the other hand, several guards told POGO that in the face of a real terrorist attack, they believe that being outnumbered, out-trained and outgunned, along with the low morale exacerbated by poor compensation, would result in a substantial number of guards using their weapons to protect themselves while leaving the plant. Many of the guards are simply not confident that they could protect their plant from a terrorist attack, and therefore believe there would be no point in trying. These are their concerns. POGO has no way to judge the extent of this problem, and is in no way questioning the courage and dedication of these guards to protect each other and the public. (Appendix A, B, C, F, G, K, L, M, N, and O) POGO has been advised by military Special Forces trained as adversarial forces that any terrorists who attack a plant would most likely be well-trained, well-equipped, highly-motivated and suicidal. This was certainly borne out on 9/11. In a terrorist attack, the initial strike would likely be extraordinarily violent, fast and with a significant level of human carnage. Unlike other nuclear power plant employees, such as nuclear operators, security guards have no association or single union voice to relay their concerns directly to the NRC. Overwhelmingly, the guards interviewed tell POGO they are:
Under-manned
The NRC has only required that the plants have between five and ten guards to protect an entire nuclear plant. According to the Code of Federal Regulations:
"The total number of guards, and armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements ["for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage"] shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case by case basis by the Commission; however, this number may not be reduced to less than five (5) guards."22
Security experts have told POGO that five guards would be clearly insufficient to win a battle with terrorists.
A number of the guards interviewed also believed they would have serious trouble defeating even the current DBT of three outside attackers, no active insider, and no multiple entries or diversions. (Appendix B, F, H, I, J, and K)
For example, the security posture at nuclear power plants is so fragile that many guard forces have "failed" mock attacks because a single guard made a mistake. Nuclear plants are designed to be protected from a single failure causing core damage - but security plans are not. The non-profit Union of Concerned Scientists and Nuclear Control Institute have advocated that security plans should be robust enough that a single mistake by a guard would not allow the attackers to win.23
According to both guards and NRC officials interviewed by POGO, the number of guards at most plants was reduced by as much as 30% after successfully completing NRC mock terrorist attack tests in the mid- to late-1990s. After 9/11, some of the power plants began to increase the size of their guard forces. Some of the guards advise they are still not up to the levels at which they passed the tests. (Appendix E, H, I, J, K, and M)
John McGaha, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer for Entergy, one of the largest operators of nuclear power plants, acknowledged:
"I mean I'll admit that plants have staffed up and energized themselves and done some things to get ready for [the mock terrorist attack tests], especially in the early days, and after the [test] was over, they backed off on some of those things."24
While a few guards said their plants have had a dramatic increase in the guard force since 9/11 - one has tripled the number of guards - most of the guards interviewed believe that they are still below levels that are adequate to defeat a real terrorist attack. (Appendix A, B, F, H, I, J, K and L)
To exploit existing resources, many utilities have relied heavily on requiring the existing guards to put in extraordinary overtime - 12 hour shifts, six days a week. A number of guards have raised serious questions about their ability to remain alert under these conditions, as these hours are both mentally and physically exhausting. One guard told POGO he had been required to work 19 hours straight. Two other guards were fired because they refused to work a sixth consecutive day of 12-hour shifts. One of these guards said he was concerned that 'he was too fatigued and would be unfit for duty for the mandated overtime." He filed a complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL) who ruled in his favor. The employer, The Wackenhut Corporation, settled with him. During its investigation, the DOL learned, "The NRC considers the 72 hour rule to be reasonable and fear that if an SO [Security Officer] is permitted to refuse to work based on fatigue it would create turmoil in the industry." (Appendix A, B, C, G, Addendum H, K, L, M, N, O, and W)
Although the NRC is currently working on a "Fatigue Rule" to restrict the number of hours nuclear operators can work, these restrictions are not being considered for guards.
Because the NRC order to increase the number of guards on duty is temporary, and is only in force as long as there is a heightened threat environment, nuclear plants are not likely to make many permanent hires until they are required to do so by the NRC. It is important to note that until a credible DBT deciding the number of adversaries and their capabilities in weaponry, tools, and tactics is issued by the NRC, the utilities are in a difficult quandary as to how to adequately size their guard forces.25
The adequate number of guards cannot simply be dictated generically. All of the plants have different physical configurations, vulnerabilities, and timelines to intercept the attackers with adequate force. Rather than determining what tactics, size of guard forces, and weaponry is adequate in a cookie-cutter manner, the NRC should allow security experts to determine these factors by performing vulnerability assessments, JTS computer modeling, and force-on-force mock terrorist performance tests for each specific site.
In addition to inadequate numbers, there is also a significant problem with high turnover. POGO has been told that turnover in the guard force at some plants is as high as 70-100% over the life of a labor contract - about 3½ years. For example, at one plant 90% of the guard force has only one year experience. (Appendix A, C, K, L, M and P)
Under-equipped
In 2002, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the nuclear industry's trade group, placed advertisements in the Washington Post and other newspapers designed to lead Congress and the public to believe that the guards at nuclear power plants are well-equipped. These advertisements depicted security guards wearing bulletproof vests and carrying semi-automatic weapons. Contrary to those images, according to NRC officials and guards themselves, most of the guards did not carry these weapons while on patrol or any other time. At the time the advertisements were placed, only about two-thirds of all nuclear power plants even provided access to the semi-automatic weapons shown in the pictures. According to NRC officials, until the Summer of 2002, one-third of the nuclear plant guard forces around the country were equipped only with shotguns and revolvers.
The power and range of the weapons provided to many of the guards are vastly inferior to the weapons known to be used by terrorists. This is in part caused by some state laws that restrict the types of weapons and ammunition carried by private security forces. Several of the guards explained that they will be simply out-gunned if a terrorist attack takes place. Not only do they believe the number of outside attackers in the DBT is unrealistic, but they also believe their weaponry would never match up to that of a real terrorist. One guard with extensive military experience said, "a guard can be an excellent shot, but if he's out-gunned, he dies." Shotguns, pistols and sometimes semi-automatic AR-15s cannot compete with the automatic weapons, even the NRC expects terrorists to use let alone the sniper rifles, grenade launchers, or rocket-propelled grenades with which attacking terrorists, in all likelihood, will be equipped. (Appendix B, E, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, O, and P)
Some guards with military backgrounds are particularly concerned that the terrorists with the use of hand grenades and other explosives inside the target buildings, would take out multiple guards. (Appendix E and F)
Other guards said they have traditionally been equipped only with 9-millimeter pistols and only had access to shotguns and bulletproof vests that were locked up at a central location, sometimes more than a football field's distance away. In case of a real attack, the guards would have to get to that location, unlock the cabinet, retrieve their shotguns and protective gear, and return to their post. By that time, terrorists could have achieved their goals and may have caused catastrophic damage. Unbelievably, it took the February 2002 order from the NRC before facilities finally began requiring guards to carry their "primary weapon" (i.e. shotgun or rifle) for the first time. (Appendix A, H, I, J, K, N, O, and P)
One National Guard team leader stationed at a nuclear power plant told POGO that he had major concerns about the security at that plant, and the ability of guards to defend themselves. He said he could see virtually every security guard post from his vantage point outside the perimeter fence. Although these posts are bullet resistant, he said that with a 50-caliber sniper rifle with armor-piercing incendiary (API) rounds, he could take out every guard post without ever having to cross the fence line. (Appendix Q)
Under-trained
Nuclear industry executives have repeatedly claimed that guards are given 270 hours of training before being posted; that they receive 90 hours per year to requalify with their weapons; and that they receive 30 hours per year in antiterrorist tactical exercises. They have claimed that guards are trained to resist "a determined violent external assault, attack by stealth or deceptive actions, by several persons," and to assume that attackers could have military skills, inside assistance, hand-held automatic weapons, and a four-wheel drive vehicle.26 None of these claims appear to be true.
When asked to explain industry's claims that guards receive 270 hours of training before beginning their job, one guard joked, "Maybe if you add the training hours of all the guards together." (Appendix F)
According to two former Seabrook nuclear power plant guards who were hired post-9/11, they were only given four days of tactical training and three days of weapons training before being posted. Neither they, nor any of the other 14 recruits in their training class, had military or law enforcement experience. The majority of those recruits had never even fired a weapon before. Yet during their training they were limited to firing 96 rounds with their handguns and fewer rounds with their shotguns, and were told they "would not be firing our service weapons again until the annual qualifications." The guards said they informed the trainers more training was necessary, but were told that if they wanted more practice with the weapons, it would have to be on their own time and at their own expense. (Appendix N and O)
Most of the guards interviewed train with their weapons only once during their annual weapons qualification, and a few can practice two to three more times each year on company time if they so choose. Given the extraordinary overtime most guards are working, few are taking these opportunities. Generally, the total hours firing with their weapons is approximately two to three hours per year - hardly the 90 hours advertised by the nuclear industry. ( Appendix B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P)
Relying on requalification with weapons only once a year is not at all commensurate with the recommendation of the Firearms Division of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. This Center trains officers from more than more than 70 federal agencies and provides training services to police departments nationwide. They recommend that law enforcement agencies require their officers to qualify with their weapons on a quarterly basis.
Most guards interviewed at the nuclear power plants said they have had no training or practice in shooting at a moving target. Just recently, some guards have begun shooting at a silhouette of a person being dragged across the target range. None of the guards indicated being trained shooting on the run. (Appendix G, H, I, and J)
Guards were also inadequately trained in the use of new night vision scopes for their M-16 rifles. According to one guard who has had extensive military experience with M-16s, they received no training on the new more complicated scope. In their annual qualification, the guards were only allowed ten practice rounds before qualifying with the new equipment. He said that, for the first time, even his proficiency dropped significantly because of the new scopes. He claims he is not at all confident he will hit his target if he is using the new site during an attack. (Appendix K)
Generally, the only time the utilities require more training is just before the guard forces will be subjected to mock force-on-force tests by the NRC - which has been every eight years. (Appendix C, E, G, H, I, and J)
Underpaid
(Note: To avoid exposing the identity of POGO's sources, POGO obtained the pay scales of security guards from plants that do not correlate with the plants whose guards were interviewed for other portions of this report.)
Adequate compensation directly affects the morale and motivation of the guard forces at the nation's nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Energy Institute claims in its newspaper ads that the guards are "well-compensated professionals." However, POGO found otherwise. At least six of the plants that POGO investigated have guards who are paid between $1-$4 per hour less than the custodians or janitors at those plants. (Appendix V, Appendix V part 2, Appendix V part 3)
For example, at the Salem and Hope Creek power plant, operated by PSEG, the security guards are paid $1 per hour less than custodians and $8 per hour less than the on-site fire department. When confronted with this data, PSEG's President responded, "In summary, it should be noted that security officers are free to pursue career advancement opportunities and alternative occupations, whether that is within security, performing custodial work, or becoming a licensed operator." (Appendix T)
It appears the compensation situation was exacerbated during the 1990s when the utilities decided to subcontract their guard forces. Prior to that time, the guards worked directly for the utilities, and were on the pay and benefits scales of the utilities. The utilities then learned they could save money by contracting out. The companies that provide security at most of the plants are Burns International Service Corporation, Pinkerton Service Corporation, and The Wackenhut Corporation. As a result of subcontracting, the guards' compensation was reduced across the board. This is the main reason guards regularly make less than the custodians, who are still on the utility payroll.
The guards also often earn less than many workers who face substantially less physical risk, such as construction workers, postal clerks, funeral attendants, utility meter readers, and aerobic instructors. In one area, the guards earn about the same as recreation workers and manicurists.27 (Appendix X)
POGO obtained the salaries that guards are paid at five nuclear plants in four states and compared the highest hourly wages the guards receive to the average hourly pay for other jobs in their area. The nuclear security guards pay usually does not increase after three years, except sometimes for cost-of-living increases. (Appendix V, Appendix V part 2, Appendix V part 3)
In its salary survey, POGO found that the highest paid security guards earn significantly less annually than police and sheriff's patrol officers averaged near the plants. For example, at three plants, the highest paid guards at Limerick, near Philadelphia, and Monticello and Prairie Island near Minneapolis, earned nearly $11,000 less annually than police officers in their community. (Appendix X)
In addition to being underpaid the guards also do not receive adequate health insurance benefits. In the United States, the average cost to an employee for family health care coverage is $150 per month.28 However, for family health care coverage, nuclear security guards:
Unsure About Deadly Force
Currently, guards at nuclear power plants are generally prohibited from using deadly force unless an intruder wields a weapon, or they feel their life or the life of someone else is in danger, in accordance with state law. In other words, if a terrorist jumped over a fence with a backpack and ran toward the reactor building, a guard could only observe and report him.
Of course, there are important and legitimate reasons to restrict the guards' ability to use deadly force, given the possibility that the intruder is not in fact a terrorist. The problem is that currently, the guard forces feel they are without adequate guidance as to how to determine and prevent a genuine threat.
Nearly all of the guards interviewed by POGO raised concerns about this problem. The NRC has unsuccessfully tried to convince Congress to resolve this problem for years. In a 1999 NRC meeting, for example, NRC official Richard Rosano said that "the NRC interprets its regulations to mean that guards can use deadly force in protection of plant, property or other systems," but he added that "is not consistent with state laws to the contrary, and there is currently no federal authority on the books to grant employees of Part 50 utilities to use deadly force" to protect plant systems.30 (Appendix A, B, C, D, E, G, and L)
"The states traditionally allow the use of deadly force only to protect persons, not property, and so, absent interdiction so that you put yourself in the path of the bullets, guards are not allowed to use deadly force to protect the plant," Rosano said.31
POGO has been told of an instance when an inspector with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission observed a guard follow a mock terrorist during a force-on-force drill. While the mock terrorist "destroyed" critical target sets in the reactor complex which would have led to a meltdown, the guard did not stop him. When the guard was asked why he was not doing anything to stop him, he explained that he did not have the authority to shoot an intruder who was only destroying property.
One guard summed up the problem stating, "If you pull your trigger, you're on your own, and you'll need a good lawyer." (Appendix E)
Another guard said that at his plant there was a saying, "I'd rather be judged by twelve, than carried by six," meaning they'd shoot first and go before a jury, rather than be carried in a coffin by six pallbearers. This suggests an unreasonable tension exists between doing their job and obeying the law. (Appendix C)
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