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"Who the Hell is Regulating Who?" The NRC's Abdication of Responsibility

"I find it very disturbing when I tour a facility and see numerous out-of-service tags, or if I become aware that a substantial amount of equipment is out of service or in a degraded status. These are clear warning signs that a licensee is not providing adequate attention to its material condition and is putting unnecessary burdens on its operators. I am concerned about plants in this condition because they are reducing their safety margin and if not corrected, sooner or later it will have an adverse impact."15

These out-of-service tags are analogous to the number of high priority safety issues that remain unimplemented and unverified by the NRC. It appears that power plants accept degraded status much like the NRC accepts lack of progress on resolving high priority safety issues.

While the NRC's new plan may improve the existing safety system to some extent, the NRC itself recognizes it is not getting to the heart of the problem by requiring real repairs before issues are listed as "resolved". The new system does not examine issues that have been "resolved" without requiring corrective changes to equipment or procedures. Other factors have also been ignored: the length of time it takes the NRC to find solutions for safety issues, if any; the length of time it takes an issue to be corrected at all facilities; and the time it takes the NRC to verify changes. The NRC faces many challenges in attempting to assure the American public that risks associated with the nuclear industry are being corrected. Though the new management plan for safety issues may solve the NRC's inability to track safety issues at individual plants, it does not make these aging reactors safer.

"Category 1: Plants Removed From The List Of Problem Facilities. Plants in this category have taken effective action to correct identified problems and to implement programs for improved performance. No further NRC special attention is necessary beyond the regional office's current level of monitoring to ensure improvement continues." (The NRC listed no reactors in this category.)

"Category 2: Plants Authorized To Operate That The NRC Will Monitor Closely. Plants in this category are having or have had weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention from both headquarters and the region office. A plant will remain in this category until the licensee demonstrated a period of improved performance."

Plants in "Category 2" include: Indian Point 3 (NY), Millstone 1, 2 and 3 (CT), Browns Ferry 3 (AL), and Dresden 2 and 3 (IL).

"Category 3: Shutdown Plants Requiring NRC Authorization To Operate And Which The NRC Will Monitor Closely. Plants in this category are having or have had significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining the plant in a shutdown condition until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have both been established and implemented to ensure substantial improvement."

Plants in "Category 3" include: Browns Ferry 1 (AL).

"Declining Trend: Plants with safety performance trending downward [but not warranting designation as a Category 2 plant]."

Plants in "Declining Trend" include Hope Creek (NJ), Salem 1 and 2 (NJ).

Due to the NRC's lack of oversight and enforcement of regulations, it is critical to examine industry documents and point out deficiencies that have existed for many years. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chair of the NRC, stated, "The responsibility for safety rests with the industry. . . . Like any other regulatory body, NRC is essentially an auditing agency."17 Yet, their mission is to regulate the nuclear industry. But, there are numerous examples of the nuclear industry not working in the best interests of public safety and the NRC silently watches.

"Loss of the ability to draw water from the emergency sump could disable the emergency core cooling and containment spray systems. The consequences of the resulting inability to cool the reactor core or the containment atmosphere could be melting of the core and/or breaking of the containment."18 (emphasis added)

Despite the potential for core meltdown and loss of containment integrity, this issue was approved for resolution in 1979 and resolved without corrective requirements by the NRC in 1985. However, four incidents have caused the NRC to re-evaluate the issue's previous resolution. Incidents involving clogged sump strainers have occurred at the Perry Unit 1 plant in Ohio in April and November 1993 and, in September 1995, at the Limerick plant in Pennsylvania.19 Clogged sump strainers also caused an "event" at the Barseback 2 plant in Sweden in 1992.20 New tests show " . . . that the potential for strainer clogging may be more significant than was perceived at the time USI A-43 was resolved." 21 The resolution in 1985 did not require changes to operating plants or plants under construction, only to plants applying for new construction permits.22 NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards stated, " . . . we continue to believe that the response of the [NRC] staff and the BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] licensees to this important nuclear safety issue has been unacceptably slow."23 This is just one example of accidents occurring, with the potential " . . . for serious core damage",24 due to the NRC's failure to require industry to make changes in its operating plants.

On February 18, 1994, the NRC circulated "NRC Bulletin 93-02 Supplement 1: Debris Plugging Of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers". This bulletin requested " . . . all holders of operating licenses or construction permits for boiling-water reactors . . . " to take actions that the NRC believed would circumvent an accident from occurring due to strainer clogging. According to the NRC, boiling-water reactors accounted for 38 of the 116 nuclear reactors in the United States.25 However, the NRC allowed the licensees to decide if they would follow the NRC's requested actions or propose their own alternatives -- again, an example of the NRC delegating its authority to the nuclear industry.

"Within 60 days of the date of this bulletin supplement, a report indicating whether or not the addressee intends to comply with the actions . . . If an addressee chooses not to take the requested actions, the report shall contain a description of a proposed alternative course of action . . .".26 (emphasis added)

It is important to note that this bulletin was circulated NINE YEARS AFTER this issue was "resolved" by the NRC. Still, the NRC never returned this issue to its list of USIs. Instead, it was listed as a "multiplant action" -- another category of generic issue that is not reported to Congress.

"Many of the suits have been settled and Westinghouse has agreed with the utilities to seal important court documents. Westinghouse has gone to great lengths to keep information regarding steam generators away from other utilities and the public."36

Why has this safety issue re-emerged almost twenty years after it was first identified? Since the NRC failed to act, the issue was "resolved" with no requirements. By stalling and dismissing this issue without requiring changes in 1988, the NRC made nuclear plants more vulnerable to leaking steam generator tubes and other serious problems today.

The industry has argued that nothing can be done to prevent steam generator tubes from degrading, and watchful waiting is the only course of action that can be taken. However, in 1982, TVA's Division of Nuclear Power suggested one action that had the potential to correct this problem. A TVA Division Position Paper, "Copper Alloys in Pressurized Water Reactor Plant Steam, Condensate, and Feedwater Systems", recommended that copper in steam generators was causing corrosion problems. The Position Paper asserted, "Removal of copper by retubing or replacement of these copper alloy components is warranted."37 But, in the industry's opinion, the cost of initiating a true fix for this problem, a fix that will last for a steam generator's entire lifetime, is outweighed by short-term considerations. Profit margins, end-of-the-year bonuses and healthy settlements from Westinghouse have been enough to convince nuclear industry officials that the problem is not worth fixing -- at least not on their watch.

The NRC is fully aware of this money-first attitude. Shirley Ann Jackson recently stated, " . . . there is the danger that increased competitiveness in the electricity industry may create pressures to minimize expenditures to the point that safety is compromised."38

It is telling that a small number of plants, when replacing their copper alloy components, have used non-copper components. However, many reactors are operating with steam generator tubes that have been corroded by copper oxides. Industry has decided that the steam generator tubes need only be watched by insensitive measurement techniques during routine refueling outages -- totally ignoring TVA's Division of Nuclear Power's fourteen year-old recommendation. Tube ruptures will continue to occur as long as the NRC does not close plants when licensees ignore safety requirements.

"The incident at Vogtle was neither unique nor without precedent because loss of offsite power events, loss of decay heat removal events, and emergency diesel generator failures due to trip sensor problems have occurred. Precursor events during cold shutdown conditions at other plants involving loss of offsite power occurred 74 times between 1965 and 1989 [as of 1990]. Loss of decay heat removal with the reactor system in a reduced water level condition (near mid-loop) occurred 52 time between 1973 and 1989. Some of these loss of decay heat removal events occurred as a result of losing power. In addition, emergency diesel generator trip sensor calibration problems have occurred 32 times at other nuclear plants and 69 times at Vogtle."41

The NRC released additional data after the Vogtle accident that highlights the importance of diesel generator reliability.

• "In 89 percent of the loss [of] offsite power events that occurred between 1965 and 1989, either some major electrical power source was out of service before the event and/or some major electrical power source failed during the event."42
  
  
• "The 74 previous loss of offsite power events between 1965 and 1989 occurred with a variety of electrical sources removed from service. . . . In the 64 events for which the equipment conditions are known . . . Thirty-nine (61 percent) involved both equipment that was out of service and equipment failures."43

Despite the near disaster in March 1990 in Georgia and the data that was collected after, NUMARC voiced its opinion in a November 1990 letter to the Commission of the NRC. "We reiterate our belief that industry actions and performance together with existing docketed commitments by individual licensees provide sufficient basis for closure of Generic Issue B-56 [Diesel Reliability]."44 (APPENDIX F) One year later, an internal NRC memo highlighted how authority had eroded within the agency. Using almost identical language as NUMARC, the NRC came to the same conclusion:

"In our view, the proposed rule amendment is unnecessary to ensure adequate diesel generator reliability. We continue to believe that the commitments of the licensees to monitor and maintain diesel generator reliability as specified . . . combined with industry initiatives in this regard, are sufficient."45 (APPENDIX G)

However, industry's track record does not merit such confidence. A month following the near disaster at the Vogtle power plant, the Senior Vice-President of Nuclear Operations at the facility ". . . presented a misleading, incomplete, and inaccurate statement of diesel test results" to the NRC.46 (APPENDIX E) In June and August 1990, two other false statements were submitted by the same plant official.47 In response to the actions of the manager, the NRC fined the utility for providing them with incomplete and inaccurate information. Other sanctions have also been levied to Vogtle's senior management for actions -- harassment and intimidation -- taken against plant employees who notified the NRC that the provided information was inaccurate.

Three years after the accident at the Vogtle power plant, the final resolution for diesel reliability required no changes to existing requirements. In a meeting between the NRC and NUMARC to resolve this issue, an NRC employee indicated, " . . . the resolution of GI B-56 through the issuance of RG 1.9, Rev. 3, will not introduce any regulatory requirements . . .". The NRC employee also stated, " . . . [Emergency Diesel Generator] maintenance problems continue to exist despite reported high levels of EDG reliability (e.g. Vogtle [GA], Cooper [NE], D.C. Cook [MI], Calvert Cliffs [MD], and Zion [IL]). The NRC relies primarily on industry reported EDG performance and availability."48 (APPENDIX H) The NRC accepted the licensee's word despite three documented times when the licensee deliberately provided false statements to it. While the NRC admits that five power plants were having problems with diesel generator reliability, it dismissed the issue as "resolved", and called it a day.

Diesel reliability is closely related to two other issues that have yet to be corrected by the NRC -- Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures (GSI 23), scheduled for resolution since 1984, but not yet resolved (APPENDIX B-Table 2); and Station Blackout (USI A-44), one of the seven USIs whose resolution has not been implemented. (APPENDIX B-Table 3) The lack of implementation verification of Station Blackout solutions, the NRC's ten year delay in correcting the Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures issue, and the dismissal of Diesel Reliability as being "resolved" should cause concern, as these issues were supposed to have been resolved in coordination with each other. Public safety is at risk because the NRC unnecessarily takes nearly twenty years to examine, solve, implement and verify required safety changes.

"When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boiloff."49 (emphasis added)

However, Thermo-Lag 330-1 was declared "inoperable" by the NRC in 1992 after the persistent efforts of an industry whistleblower could no longer be ignored regarding the product's substandard performance for fire resistance. The fire barrier had repeatedly failed fire endurance testing and it was finally determined that the barrier burned like "treated plywood." Yet the NRC continues to drag its feet on Thermo-Lag's major impact on reactor safety. Like most other safety issues, the NRC has not required this issue be fixed -- despite the significant hazard presented by fire, and the fact that Thermo-Lag 330-1 has not provided the level of safety required by current NRC regulations. An internal NRC document states, " . . . fires are a significant contributor to the overall core damage frequency, contributing anywhere from 7 percent to 50 percent of the total".50 The document also asserts, "Based on plant operating experience over the last 20 years, it has been observed that typical nuclear power plants will have three or four significant fires over their operating lifetime."51 (emphasis added) Yet, the NRC has not required the industry to replace this inoperable fire barrier.

Originally, 82 operating U.S. reactors installed Thermo-Lag 330-1 to protect reactor safe shutdown equipment as required by NRC regulations. However, 57 reactors have not yet replaced Thermo-Lag, while other plants have "resolved" the issue by only scheduling resolution.52 (APPENDIX I) Instead of requiring that this safety issue be corrected immediately, the NRC requested all affected plants to implement immediate "compensatory measures" -- continuous fire watch patrols wherever Thermo-Lag is installed in the nuclear power station.

While this may be the cheapest way for the industry to delay removing all Thermo-Lag from their facilities, it is certainly not the answer -- nor even an effective interim measure. Fire watch patrols will only allow a plant to identify a fire after it occurs, they cannot substitute for or "compensate" as an operable fire barrier in the event that human access is impossible , as in the example of a fire associated with high radiation fields. Thermo-Lag's designed function is to suppress, retard and protect the vital safety equipment from fire damage for up to three hours in areas where no fire suppression systems are installed. The NRC's acquiescence to the industry's implementation of fire watch patrols is merely a delay from replacing Thermo-Lag with another fire protection rated barrier that can perform its required safety function.

Additionally, fire watch patrols do not compensate for the inoperable Thermo-Lag 330-1 barrier because patrols have been documented by the NRC to have missed or to have been found sleeping during their watch. As of October 1995, the NRC's Public Document Room in Washington, DC documented thirteen instances of missed fire watch at nuclear power plants. The mere fact that fire watches are missed and Thermo-Lag fails NRC requirements should prompt the regulator to determine a final resolution, replacing Thermo-Lag with an operable fire barrier, and require licensees to implement it without delay. Instead, the NRC leans toward granting plant-specific exemptions to nuclear power plants that will allow them to continue to use fire watch as an interim measure for their inoperable fire barrier.

Plant-specific exemptions are common when the NRC considers fire protection issues. "The NRC has granted more than 1,200 exemptions to specific requirements of the fire protection rule since it was issued in 1981."53 According to James Taylor's April 3, 1996 letter to the Commission, while only a small number of plants have actually "closed out" the issue, 27 plants (over 30%) have submitted exemptions to the NRC concerning the status of Thermo-Lag 330-1 in their respective plant.54 (APPENDIX I) Are the utilities' reasons for submitting these exemptions valid or will this be an example of the NRC failing to enforce its own requirements?

Numerous tests prove that Thermo-Lag 330-1 cannot perform its required safety function. However, this information only came to light after many facilities had installed the fire barrier. The NRC simply did not review, test or verify the manufacturer's procedures or results -- similar to the NRC's blind acceptance that licensees have made required safety corrections without verification. The NRC Inspector General found, " . . . the [NRC] staff did not take any significant action between 1982 and 1991 when reports of problems with Thermo-Lag 330-1 were received."55 Why did it take the NRC nearly 10 years to take action against the industry for having installed a combustible fire barrier?

Hence, the NRC blindly approved a safety-related system that has placed dozens of nuclear power plants in non-compliance with fire protection regulations and that continues to jeopardize public safety by failing to bring the issue to closure with the required installation of operable fire barriers. This is just one more example of poor oversight by the government's regulating agency.

Perhaps the NRC is more interested in shielding the industry than it is in shielding the safe shutdown equipment vital to public health and safety.

"In September 1985, the NRC staff issued a letter to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), discussing significant continuing weaknesses in TVA performance and stating that management of the TVA nuclear program was ineffective. . . . The number and complexity of relevant issues were not limited to the operating reactors, since questionable construction practices had also been identified at the TVA's Watts Bar (Tenn.) project."56

TVA's weaknesses and ineffectiveness have yet to be corrected. It has been more than ten years since the NRC originally notified TVA of its problems. Currently, the NRC's "Watch List" includes Browns Ferry 3 in "Category 2" and Browns Ferry 1 in "Category 3".

Plant	Section I	Section II	Section III	Section IV	Section V	Section VI
Browns Ferry	26%	43%	36%	53%	41%	33%
Sequoyah	51%	34%	34%	42%	44%	36%
Watts Bar	32%	20%	15%	31%	13%	10%
Mean Score	36%	32%	28%	42%	33%	26%

TVA decided that the results of the tests were so poor that they needed " . . . to implement changes intended to strengthen their continuing training program."59 However, this issue was brought to the forefront " . . . as a result of a recent independent audit finding . . . ." In other words, TVA was forced to acknowledge the problem because of internal complaints from whistleblowers who, notwithstanding considerable risk to themselves, appear to be the only semblance of accountability the nuclear industry grudgingly must endure. However, this incident was not the first time that these problems were highlighted. TVA documented the technicians' low job knowledge for five years before it took action. A 1987 internal TVA memorandum highlighted the need to change their training program to include more training on technical issues and past experiences at other facilities.60 The next year, a second TVA memorandum stated, " . . . individuals displayed weak knowledge . . . . "61 In 1989, the problem was again recorded in an internal TVA document, "Deficiencies exist in the expected knowledge of some chemistry personnel."62 But, again, TVA and the individual utilities did nothing to improve their training programs. Where was NRC oversight to ensure that plant employees were trained properly?

The incestuous relationship that has been established between the NRC and the industry, in this case, the TVA, causes both groups to side-step issues that have the potential to cause a backlash against the industry. In this case, changes were finally made to TVA's training program in 1993, which caused training hours to almost double. While the NRC is trying to give more power to the utilities, cases like this one highlight the essential need for an independent body that is not inter-twined with the industry it is supposed to regulate.

"Operability of system pumps, valves, controls, and instrumentation should be demonstrated, and, to the extent practical, testing should provide reasonable assurance that flow instabilities, e.g., "water hammer" will not occur in system components, piping, or inside the steam generators during normal system startup and operation."65 (emphasis added)

If this is true, then why was this requirement obviated at Watts Bar? Three water hammer events have occurred at Watts Bar since 1994, occurring both before and after the plant received its operating license -- none of which are considered acceptable by NRC regulations. Were the NRC's reasons for not following their own regulations valid or is this instance another example of the NRC failing to enforce its own requirements?

"Furthermore, NRC found that it had not ensured that the licensee had corrected identified problems. Instead, according to NRC, it relied on the licensee's programs and commitment to correct recurring problems, which, in retrospect, were not effective. . . . According to NRC, it did not consistently pursue enforcement actions against the licensee because it had developed a 'practice' of providing the licensee with 'additional latitude' to address known problems."72 (emphasis added)

An NRC task force, known as the South Texas Project Task Force, was organized in mid-1994 to evaluate the NRC's inspection program effectiveness at the South Texas plant. Their subsequent report dated March 31, 1995 stated:

"This was also reflected in the [South Texas Plant] inspection history, where individual inspector decisions not to pursue issues that could have resulted in NRC violations at times appeared to have been based upon ongoing licensee corrective action efforts that, in retrospect, were not consistently effective. . . . Several licensee programs that the NRC considered to be functional . . . were not as effective as licensee intentions or commitments would convey. An apparent over-reliance on [Houston Light and Power Co.] commitments for "get well" programs appeared to partially mask declining performance into 1992. . . . However, in the past an over-reliance on the effectiveness of licensee programs and commitments to correct recurrent problems delayed NRC actions in requesting [Houston Light and Power] to resolve the deficiencies in a more timely manner." 73 (emphasis added)

Plant management stated that the risk of an accident during the time that these systems were inoperable was very low. Would you expect any other response from a utility? Risk, however, is the product of the probability of an accident as well as its consequences. Thus, the probability of an accident occurring had not changed but the risk associated with the consequences of an accident increased significantly due to the unavailability of the safety equipment. The NRC fined the power plant $325,000 for not having the safety systems operational as required. Still, the NRC's delegation of authority allowed the licensee to wait more than a month to shut down their plant and notify the NRC about their safety problems.

"In support of his concern that NUMARC has improperly influenced the NRC staff, the alleger asserted that in response to the draft of the new specifications, NUMARC provided the NRC with approximately 25,000 comments which were all accepted by NRC management over objections of the NRC staff . . . . NRC upper management appeared to accept the industry position on the technical specifications program even though the staff developed positions to the contrary."75

While the investigation could not prove that NUMARC and the NRC were in collusion with each other, remarkably, all 25,000 comments made by the nuclear industry were accepted by the NRC. For decades, the industry has curbed regulations that would improve operating procedures. The current relationship between the industry and the NRC parallels the earlier relationship between the industry and the AEC. The pressure cast on the NRC by the industry comes from four influential groups: INPO, which is able to keep their information from the public by skillfully copyrighting documents, making it illegal to reproduce INPO reports without their written consent; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), which acts as the industry's lobbying group and was formed from four different groups including NUMARC; the nuclear reactor manufacturers (i.e. General Electric and Westinghouse); and the individual licensees who provide nearly all NRC funding.

Former NRC Chairman Ivan Selin has criticized "INPO's actions as 'lobbying' on behalf of the nuclear power industry rather than raising safety concerns." 76 (APPENDIX N) The NRC believed that INPO crossed a line when they filed " . . . complaints on behalf of a particular utility against a specific NRC manager, as well as INPO involvement in an industry sponsored study which was critical of the NRC." 77 According to Selin, INPO performed NEI's role as the "lobbyist" for the nuclear industry. However, both groups are assembled by high level officials from individual power plants and the companies that own the plants. More than one-half of INPO's twelve-member Board of Directors also sit on the Board of Directors for NEI. Essentially, the same individuals who are supposed to operate as independent evaluators of safety issues also serve as lobbyists for the nuclear industry. INPO and NEI managed to influence the NRC and dilute proposed NRC regulations for decades before Ivan Selin decided to draw a line between the two groups.

Though the NRC only recently discovered these two industry groups have overstepped their boundaries, many critics have observed the incestuous relationship between the regulator and the regulated since its creation:

• "In fact it is difficult now to determine . . . where the Commission ends and the industry begins." 78 (regarding the AEC) Senator Abraham Ribicoff - 1974
  
  
• " . . . the NRC has sometimes erred on the side of the industry's convenience rather than carrying out its primary mission of assuring safety. . . . both licensees and vendors often have strong financial disincentive to evaluate and report safety problem that may result in more stringent regulations, at least in part because it is uncertain which entity will ultimately bear the cost of increased safety." 79 (emphasis added) Kemeny Commission Report - 1979
  
  
• "The intimacy between the NRC and the nuclear industry goes beyond what the public and Congress have tolerated at other federal agencies. . . . the NRC has released draft investigation, inspection and evaluation reports to their subjects, and the Commission has consistently failed to take disciplinary action against the responsible officials."80 (emphasis added) Union of Concerned Scientists - 1985
  
  
• "Who the hell is regulating who? In my opinion, the NRC did not have to buckle to industry pressure. . . . As a result, the NRC has essentially left it to the nuclear industry to regulate itself." 81 Loren L. Bush, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chief - 1987 (APPENDIX O)
  
  
• " . . . NRC may take from several months to 10 or more years to resolve (identify and approve a solution for) generic issues, including those NRC believes pose the highest safety risk. . . . The longer these issues remain open, the less assurance NRC has that safety standards are up to date and the plants are operating safely."82 (emphasis added) General Accounting Office - 1987
  
  
• " . . . in the long run, lax regulation could lead to an accident which could have disastrous consequences for the American people and for the future of the American nuclear power industry. . . . the NRC has acted as if it were the advocate for, and not the regulator of, the nuclear industry. . . . Time and again the NRC has afforded the relief sought by the industry. . . . the nuclear industry has been extremely successful in obtaining relief from regulatory processes and requirements it deemed burdensome. . . . However, the NRC must distinguish between communication and accommodation."83 (emphasis added) Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives - 1987 (APPENDIX P)
  
  
• "The nuclear regulators appear once again to have exhibited regulatory and oversight passivity and paralysis. . . . Despite their track record, NRC still operates in a manner where it trusts those it regulates."84 (emphasis added) Representative John D. Dingell - 1993

Given the NRC's problems in trying to regulate the most hazardous industry in the world, recent feuds have erupted between the industry, the NRC, the Senate and the President. The NRC is governed by a five-member commission, nominated by the President and approved by the Senate. An example of the industry's influence over the NRC and Congress can be observed in the recent appointments and confirmations of NRC Commissioners. Shirley Ann Jackson, who was appointed as the Chair of the NRC and was a member of INPO's Advisory Council, did not encounter any problems obtaining Senate confirmation. According to the Washington Post, a second appointment to the Commission, Greta Joy Dicus, was recently confirmed because " . . . the Republicans liked her because of her industry support."85 However, Dan Berkovitz's nomination, " . . . blocked by industry opposition . . . ", was stalled in the Senate from January to October 1995. He conceded his NRC appointment by taking a position at the Department of Energy.86 "Industry support" appears to be the difference between Senate confirmation and rejection for NRC nominees.

"Because the continuing problems at [Watts Bar Nuclear Plant] are of very significant concern to the NRC, a significant civil penalty would normally be proposed. However, I am not persuaded that such an action can help bring about the necessary changes any more readily than the multitude of program changes [Tennessee Valley Authority] has unsuccessfully implemented at [Watts Bar Nuclear Plant] since its shutdown of its nuclear program in 1985." (emphasis added) 90 (APPENDIX Q)

Another concern arises due to the fact that utilities highlight profit before safety. Shirley Ann Jackson has alluded to this problem in recent speeches, "When we couple the risk of complacency with the economic pressures on utilities to reduce plant operating and maintenance costs, there is a potential for problems to go unnoticed or to be acted upon too slowly".91 (emphasis added)

A final concern involves whistleblowers. TIME's cover story was brought to the forefront by Millstone whistleblowers who wanted to correct problems that had plagued their plant. Whistleblowers throughout the nuclear industry have been instrumental in pointing out its deficiencies. However, concerned nuclear industry whistleblowers are met with staunch criticism, and many of them are harassed, intimidated and fired. One NRC policy did nothing to correct this problem.

In 1991, the NRC entered into a "Memorandum Of Understanding" with the TVA, which allowed TVA to conduct investigations into whistleblower complaints filed with the NRC. The NRC's Office of Inspector General reported that the NRC turned over the identities of TVA employees, who had reported safety concerns and because they feared TVA retaliation, were granted confidentiality, to the TVA. This act was done " . . . without the individuals' consent or knowledge."92 The IG's report stated, "The investigation determined that Region 2 employees are, based on a regional office instruction, misleading allegers as to what degree they can expect their identities to be protected."93

Many times nuclear whistleblowers are labelled as being "anti-nuclear" by those who fear them. Whistleblowers usually are trying to correct safety concerns, terminate wasteful spending practices or remedy mismanagement within their agen