Endnotes for POGO's report,

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex:
Homeland Security Opportunities




1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







2. The Design Basis Threat (DBT) describes the level of threat the protective force is required to defend against – the number of outside attackers and inside conspirators, and the kinds of weapons and size of truck bombs that would be available to terrorists. The NRC created a slightly higher DBT for its nuclear weapons sites than the weak standard it uses for commercial nuclear power plants.







3. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04623.pdf
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







4. The first attempt to increase security didn’t result in very significant changes. The second increase, however, was far more significant because the new standards finally took into account the possibility of Improvised Nuclear Devices.







5. This manpower cost is equivalent to 1,000 new 24/7 posts for these seven sites and does not include the six Category 1 nuclear sites not under the purview of NNSA.







6. A limited number of facilities already use activated barriers such as sticky foam and cold smoke or other barriers, which are released when the doors of a vault are opened without proper authorization.  This type of mechanism is a very effective delay mechanism, and can significantly reduce the necessity for the much more expensive recurring costs of protective forces.







7. Known as a Perimeter Intrusion Detection Assessment System (PIDAS).







8. Ferguson, Charles. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, CA, 2004. Foreword.







9. One can also make an improvised bomb out of plutonium, but it takes longer to complete.







10. POGO was able to piece together open source material, and had both the National Security Council and the Pentagon review the 2001 report before releasing it publicly.







11. According to a witness at the meeting.







12. McPhee, John. The Curve of Binding Energy. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: New York . 1974, pp. 189-194; and

Ferguson , Charles D. and William C. Potter. "Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism." Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Summer 2004, p.12.
http://www.wmdcommission.org
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).








13. Alvarez, Luis W. Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist. Basic Books: New York . 1987, p. 125.







14. Wald, Matthew L. “Suicidal Nuclear Threat Is Seen at Weapon’s Plants.” New York Times, January 22, 2002 .







15. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/primer/Section_I.html
(downloaded March 23, 2005).







16. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which licenses the commercial nuclear power plants that create neptunium in their waste, still does not recognize neptunium as a Special Nuclear Material.  Neptunium is not easy to obtain from U.S. commercial reactors, as U.S. spent fuel is not reprocessed. However, many European and Asian countries do reprocess theirs. As Los Alamos scientist Steve Clement commented, “There is a lot of neptunium out there in the world.”







17. http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical2.asp?print=true
(downloaded March 23, 2005).







18. Downblending is the reduction of uranium enrichment levels from 80-90% to less than 20%.







19. This was commonly known as the Scowcroft Report, after former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who chaired the commission.







20. Lyman, Edwin. “Disposition of Fissile Materials: Status and Prospects.” Discussion Paper for Stanford Summer Study on Fissile Materials, August 18-22, 2003 .







21. http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BrooksAprilTestimony.pdf
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







22. A plutonium pit is the plutonium part of a nuclear weapon, and is in the shape of a sphere.







23. POGO has been asked by the DOE to refrain from naming the weapons the protective force at Lawrence Livermore is lacking.







24. There are two facilities named Sandia: one is in Albuquerque , NM and the other is right next to Lawrence Livermore in the San Francisco Bay Area.







25. http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0658.pdf
(downloaded February 20, 2005 ).







26. Vartabedian, Ralph. “Removing Nuclear Material From Livermore Examined; Safety overhaul includes diluting uranium and possibly federalizing on-site security guards.” Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2004 .








27. POGO remains neutral on the question of maintaining the two design labs.







28. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Savannah River Site Canyon Utilization. March 2002. http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/srs/tr_20020321_sr.pdf
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







29. Perimeter Intrusion Detection Assessment System (PIDAS)







30. http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=28225
(downloaded March 23, 2005 ).







31. http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-TA18closure-082004.pdf
(downloaded February 20, 2005 ).







32. “Nuclear Insecurity.” CBS News’ 60 Minutes, August 29, 2004 .  http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/12/60minutes/main599957.shtml
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







33. http://www.nuclearfuelservices.com
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).







34. http://www.bwxt.com/operations/npd.html
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).








35. http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BrooksAprilTestimony.pdf
(downloaded March 23 , 2005 ).








36. Hertsgaard, Mark. “Nuclear Insecurity.” Vanity Fair, November 2003, p. 190.








37. http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/ea-040101-oakridge.html 
(downloaded March 23, 2005 ).








38. http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0636.pdf
(downloaded March 2 3 , 2005 ).








39. http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-nytimes-12212004.pdf
(downloaded February 20, 2005 ).







40. http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-01262005-Abraham.pdf
(downloaded February 20, 2005 ).








41. The 130 metric tons of PU described in the document is interesting, as the U.S. government has never admitted producing more than approximately 100 metric tons of PU for the weapons program.








42. Federal law requires that the Mixed-Oxide Fuel plant start producing fuel by 2009 so that surplus plutonium shipped to South Carolina will be used up by 2019 or the federal government must pay the State a fine of $1 million per day.







43. Concerns about the Ogalalla Aquifer must be addressed for this plan to be feasible.