The Project on Government Oversight

Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture and Weapons Complex for Transition to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World, April 8, 2009
 

Easy Money: Top Five Recommendations for Increasing Revenue and Cutting Costs, February 27, 2009
 

Breaking the Sound Barrier: Experiences of Air Marshals Confirm Need for Reform at the OSC, November 25, 2008

The Office of Special Counsel is the agency to which whistleblowers in the federal government must turn for help. This investigative report seeks not only to set the record straight on former Special Counsel Bloch's actual accomplishments, but also to provide lessons learned for the next Special Counsel. As a case study, POGO focused on the OSC's handling of federal air marshal cases for two reasons: President Bush has pointed to the critical role in homeland security played by air marshals, and Bloch himself has touted his work with air marshals as evidence of the success of his tenure. Despite contacting almost a dozen current and former air marshals who blew the whistle, POGO could not identify one instance in which the OSC upheld its responsibility to provide a secure whistleblower disclosure channel for the resolution of workplace improprieties, to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, and to hold accountable those responsible for whistleblower retaliation. 

Drilling the Taxpayer: Department of Interior's Royalty-In-Kind Program, September 18, 2008

In its fifth report since 1995 about oil and gas royalties, POGO examines the mismanagement and corruption in the Department of the Interior's Royalty-In-Kind program. The report tracks how industry's influence on the RIK program has been pervasive, and can be traced from the program's inception through its expansion into the full-blown program that exists today.  In the face of these numerous problems, POGO now demands the program be abolished. 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Livermore Homes and Plutonium Make Bad Neighbors, March 17, 2008

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore Lab), a nuclear weapons facility located in the greater metropolis of San Francisco, CA, poses the most significant security threat of any such facility in the U.S. Roughly seven million people live within a 50 mile radius of the Livermore Lab, which has approximately one ton of weapons-grade and weapons-quantity of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, DOE's most dangerous and expensive-to-guard special nuclear material (SNM). If terrorists gained access to this material, they could detonate them, devastating the San Francisco Bay Area and inland regions—the key agricultural areas of California . POGO has learned that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has given Livermore Lab a waiver so that it does not have to meet the current security requirements devised by the intelligence community. While NNSA pledges to remove the material from Livermore Lab by the end of 2012, POGO has determined that the material can safely be removed by early 2009, saving taxpayers a $160 million in security costs and eliminating a homeland security vulnerability that puts the surrounding population needlessly at risk.

Inspectors General: Many Lack Essential Tools for Independence, February 26, 2008

As the 30th anniversary of the law creating the Inspector General system approaches, POGO has seized the moment to closely examine how effective this critical component of our government actually functions. POGO distributed a questionnaire to all 64 statutory IGs, receiving responses from 49 of them.  Many were found to lack sufficient resources, the ability to tap into their own budgets, reliable in-house legal advice, autonomy over their own websites, and unfettered investigative authority.  POGO's findings raise critical questions that must be addressed; to that end, the report makes a number of recommendations aimed at improving Inspector General independence so IGs can better serve the U.S. taxpayer by ferreting out waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct.  

Rescue At Risk: Crucial Helicopter Requirement Weakened, November 13, 2007

A crucial weapons system requirement for the Air Force's second highest procurement priority, a helicopter replacement program (dubbed CSAR-X) for its combat search and rescue mission, was significantly and inappropriately weakened by Air Force program officials to allow Boeing's Chinook helicopter to compete.  Boeing eventually won the CSAR-X contract, worth an estimated $10-15 billion.  POGO's findings indicate that the acquisition process was subverted, and the needs of the warfighter consequently undermined. As a result, the wrong helicopter for the mission may have been procured, possibly putting at risk the men and women in our armed forces who need to be rescued. 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk, October 16, 2006

Two Department of Energy nuclear weapons facilities in Eastern Tennessee are at high risk, and can not meet the government's security standards.  If a terrorist attacks the Y-12 National Security Complex or the Oak Ridge National Labs, and detonates an improvised nuclear device with the more than 400 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium or the 1000 cans of U-233 stored at the sites, more than 60,000 people living in the area would die.

Preying On The Taxpayer: The F-22A Raptor, July 25, 2006

In June, the Senate authorized the government to purchase 20 F-22A  Raptor fighter jets each year for 2008, 2009, and 2010 using a multiyear procurement (MYP) strategy. If Lockheed, the aircraft's manufacturer is able to secure MYP status, it would essentially lock the government into buying the 60 additional troubled F-22A's and minimize the possibility that the program could suffer further funding cuts. An MYP would also result in the American taxpayers  paying Lockheed $1 billion more than they would under the normal annual procurement process. 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities, May 19, 2005

As internal tests and analyses have shown, the Department of Energy cannot adequately protect America's voluminous stockpile of weapons grade nuclear material, which is housed at 13 locations throughout the country. In the post-9/11 era, we know that suicidal terrorists are capable of massive attacks – the worst possible scenario would be terrorists penetrating a nuclear facility and building an improvised nuclear bomb, which could have a similar force of the Hiroshima blast. In this report, POGO makes recommendations that will reduce the number of sites containing these nuclear materials from 13 down to seven. 

Taxpayers Carry the Load: The C-130J Cargo Plane Does Not, March 15, 2005

In the closing days of 2004, the Department of Defense cancelled the overpriced C-130J aircraft program. The program's boosters in Congress and Lockheed Martin, the contractor, immediately began a massive disinformation program about the alleged (but non-existent) need for the aircraft – the Air Force has been moth-balling older but better versions of the transport aircraft yet is asking for C-130Js despite their wide ranging technical problems. Not to mention the government's inability to truly audit the costs of the contractor on this project. Now many in Congress are trying to reinstate funding for the C-130J, a move that will benefit Lockheed Martin more than America's war-fighting capabilities.

The Politics of Contracting, June 29, 2004

There is a revolving door between the government and large private contractors where conflict of interest is the rule, not the exception. Within the government contracting system, individuals move seamlessly between government and contractor positions, potentially subverting the contracting process. This practice is both accepted and entrenched. The Politics of Contracting details specific revolving door cases and sheds light on the flawed system that allows them.

A contracting system where current and former public servants use their positions for private gain means powerful private corporations can rig the system in their favor. This skewed process costs taxpayers, limits or eliminates competition from businesses that may be the best for the job, and results in flawed policies and bad procurement decisions. In addition, the revolving door exacerbates public distrust, which can result in the decline in civic participation and it demoralizes career civil servants to see their supervisors and co-workers use their government positions as stepping stones for private gain.

Congressional Research Service Products: Taxpayers Should Have Easy Access , February 10, 2003

$81 million of tax-payer money funded the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in FY 2002. CRS authors products at the request of current Members of Congress, many of whom become lobbyists, but CRS products are made difficult if not impossible for the public to access. CRS also operates both the CRS website and the Legislative Information System (LIS) website, which are arguably the best sources of information regarding the legislative process of the United States. However, they are not available to the public in any form. To prevent public access to its websites, CRS has erected a firewall which redirects non-Congressional inquiries to the public THOMAS site which is not as comprehensive. POGO champions open government and recommends that CRS products be made more accessible to the citizenry. 

Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices From Inside the Fences, September 12, 2002

Security guards at only one of four nuclear power plants are confident their plant could defeat a terrorist attack, according to interviews conducted by POGO for this report. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates the utilities operating nuclear power plants. The utilities generally subcontract with private guard companies for security services. The security guards say morale is currently very low and that they are under-manned, under-equipped, under-trained, and underpaid. More than 20 security guards protecting 24 nuclear reactors (located at 13 plants) were interviewed during POGO's investigation into nuclear plant security. POGO offers 29 recommendations to toughen security at the nuclear power plants.

Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System, May 10, 2002

Many of the U.S. government's largest contractors have been found to have repeatedly broken the law or engaged in misconduct, according to POGO's investigation. However, they are never even temporarily suspended, let alone debarred, from gaining additional government contracts, contrary to Reagan/Bush era laws. POGO's research found that, since 1990, 43 of the government's top contractors paid approximately $3.4 billion in fines/penalties, restitution, and settlements. Furthermore, four of the top 10 government contractors have at least two criminal convictions. And yet, only one of the top 43 contractors has been suspended or debarred from doing business with the government, and then, for only five days. Our report includes recommendations to improve the system to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not awarded to contractors with long rap sheets.

Pick Pocketing The Taxpayer: The Insidious Effects of Acquisition Reform, March 11, 2002

In the 1990s, corporate lobbyists mounted an offensive against what they saw as an overbearing government system of buying goods and services. Most of the reforms they sought, however, unraveled useful taxpayer protections created during the infamous defense contractor scandals of the 1980s. Under the rubric of streamlining government and increasing competition, taxpayer protections were rolled back using a platform of reforms known as "Acquisition Reform."

Now government watchdogs have issued a series of reports documenting an increase in several types of contractor ripoffs. Meanwhile, the much-touted benefits of "Acquisition Reform" have yet to materialize. 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk, October 1, 2001

Our investigation revealed that the Department of Energy (DOE) is failing to adequately protect the American public from the possibility of a terrorist attack on one of its nuclear weapons facilities. Guards at the facilities are poorly equipped, spread thin, and lack training needed to defend against a real terrorist attack. The DOE stores tons of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium that could be stolen or used to create and detonate an improvised nuclear device. 

At the Federal Election Commission Things Don't Add Up, March 28, 2001

The building blocks for campaign finance disclosure–identifying who is getting money from whom, and how much–rely solely on the FEC's databases, yet this basic information is incorrect. The enormous discrepancies between the amount of money the PACs (Political Action Committee) reported giving and the amount of money the House and Senate candidates reported receiving –a total discrepancy of over $12 million, only taking into account incumbents– demonstrate that the FEC is not fulfilling its mission. When the database for the candidate reports is compared with the database for the PAC reports, only six incumbent candidates match–in the entire Congress. Furthermore, FEC's two websites are neither linked nor concurrently updated. Among the inherent problems, a PAC will often be known by different names because the FEC does not require a standardized method to identify a PAC. Additionally, confusing forms have contributed to the dissemination of incorrect information. The Senate is further complicating the availability of information because it still hand files written reports. This report identifies seven sources of misinformation in the FEC's data and recommends specific reforms that must be addressed in order for more broad-reaching campaign finance reforms to be successful. 

Will We Ever Fly Before We Buy? F-22 Doesn't Meet Basic Testing Criteria, January 2, 2001

The Pentagon is rushing to begin production of the F-22 fighter without first meeting all testing requirements imposed by Congress. This report exposes the plan to recommend releasing $2.1 billion for 10 F-22 fighters even though the aircraft has not met as many as five out of 11 testing criteria required to be met before funding is released. This first wave of the production process, known as low-rate initial production, is expected despite Congress' clear directive in the defense budget bills of 2000 and 2001 that F-22 production funding only be released if all 11 testing criteria are met. The Pentagon should not only adhere to these very minimal testing criteria before going into production, it should set a higher standard requiring that all operational testing be completed, particularly of the avionics (the eyes, ears and brain of the plane) prior to costly buys of new aircraft like the F-22. No greater lesson than this was learned from the "buy before fly" B-1 and B-2 bomber fiascos. 

The F-22 Program: Fact Versus Fiction, August 10, 2000

A report criticizing the F-22 aircraft by legendary aircraft designer and retired Air Force Col. Everest E. Riccioni 

Defense Waste & Fraud Camouflaged As Reinventing Government, September 1, 1999
 

Tripwired? Document Trail of Faulty Airplane Wiring Demonstrates Need For Comprehensive Review, May 11, 1998

POGO's investigation found that the military has been aware of serious wiring problems on its aircraft since at least the early 1980s, but failed to notify regulators. Furthermore, POGO discovered that wiring experts who tried to blow the whistle on flammable wiring problems were silenced and retaliated against over many years. The miltary's actions left millions of commercial air travelers vulnerable to this deadly problem. 

Re-Establishing Institutional Integrity at the FEC: Ten Common Sense Campaign Finance Disclosure Reforms, March 5, 1998
 

Defense and Health Care Industries: Rather Than Clean Up Their Act, They Attack the Act, January 1, 1997
 

Who the Hell is Regulating Who? The NRC's Abdication of Responsibility, September 1, 1996

After a two-year investigation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), POGO's findings proved that for nearly twenty years the NRC has acquiesced to the nuclear industry by allowing significant safety problems to fester for years before they are actually, if ever, fixed. The NRC had not verified 389 high priority safety improvements that the operators claim to have fixed, or implemented, at every nuclear power plant in the United States. Additionally, there were 76 "high priority" safety improvements that remained unimplemented at a minimum of 62 different nuclear plants - some of which were "resolved" by the NRC as far back as 1978. 

Wait! There Is More Money to Collect...Unpaid Oil Royalties Across the Nation, January 1, 1996

POGO's initial 2 reports revealed the federal government's failure to collect royalties from oil companies that drill on public lands in California. This report shows evidence that the federal government's failure to adequately collect oil royalties is nationwide – involving at least 13 States, 3 Native American Nations and numerous private landowners. 

No Light At the End of This Tunnel: Boston's Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel Project, February 1, 1995

In 1995, the Boston Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel, more commonly known as the Big Dig, ran billions over budget and years behind schedule. Sold to Congress as a $2.3 billion project to be completed in 1998, the Big Dig far exceeded all cost estimates, ringing in at a stunning $14.6 billion. Building the most expensive highway project in the history of the United States, the contractors Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, drained federal money with virtually no government oversight. The lack of oversight produced flaws in design, rejection of cost saving alternatives, and problematic management practices.

Children's Ears & Antibiotics: Gold Mine for Pharmaceutical Companies, Land Mine for Children
August 1, 1994

Survey of Defense Contractor Signatories of the "Position Paper: Reform of the Federal Civil False Claims Act"
January 1, 1994

The Superconducting Super Collider's Super Excesses
January 1, 1993

High Tech Weapons In Desert Storm: Hype or Reality?
July 1, 1992

Cleaning Up Nuclear Waste: Why is DOE Five Years Behind and Billions Over Budget?, November 1, 1991
 

The Army's M1 Tank: Has It Lived Up To Expectations?
January 1, 1990