Questions Congress Should Ask About Caribbean Boat Strikes

Despite the preferences of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, our military operates within some of the most established protocols found in government. When the currency spent in pursuit of your organizational endeavors is, at its core, human lives, it serves everyone’s interests to have strong, established protocols and procedures to ensure proportionally appropriate actions and minimal collateral damage. One such process that exists at the heart of military operations is the Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC). In the military’s own words, “effective and disciplined joint targeting minimizes undesired effects, potential for collateral damage, and inefficient actions during military planning and operations.” It also, notably, “complies with the rules of engagement (ROE) and law of war.” Given the increasing politicization of today’s military, established rules and regulations such as the JTC should be considered more explicitly.

The recent operation to remove Venezuela's leader demands questions and answers, but that drastic action should not distract Congress from seeking accountability on these strikes, especially as the president continues to speak recklessly about military intervention around the world.

As lawmakers raise questions about ongoing, unsanctioned U.S. military operations in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, and Secretary Hegseth’s role in those operations, Congress is left searching for tools of oversight. However, it is through the understanding of Hegseth’s own departmental processes that Congress can find the right lines of questioning and methods of demanding accountability. The JTC is a perfect example of a process that can give lawmakers a better idea of what’s going on behind the scenes.

Since World War II, the military has used joint targeting as a means to integrate forces and align their actions in accordance with a commander’s intent. While the current iteration of the 133-page governing document, Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting, was last updated in September 2018, the core purpose of the process has been ingrained into military operations for the last 80 years. It exists not only to streamline and level set efforts across multiple staff levels and across disparate units, but also to ensure that our military engages in targeting legally, appropriately, and in a way divorced from overt political influence. As such, its established, well-defined phases and components can serve as a framework for Congress to center lines of questioning and direct their inquiries into the U.S. military’s boat strikes in the Caribbean.

What is Targeting?

In Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), a target is defined as “an entity or object that performs a function for the adversary considered for possible engagement or action.” In broad terms, a target is a thing that does something for enemies of the U.S. that we might want to strike. JP 3-60 warns against inappropriately misunderstanding targets, highlighting that caution is necessary for certain targets, since “engaging them improperly could create unintended effects.”

There are two categories of targeting outlined in JP 3-60: deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate targeting establishes planned targets, which is, by default, how all targets should be established. Planned targets are then broken into scheduled or on-call targets. In JP 3-60, it is emphasized that “all targets should flow from deliberate targeting.”

The exception, however, lies in dynamic targeting. JP 3-60 recognizes that there may be times during operations when the full process of deliberate targeting is not feasible. In those situations, dynamic targeting produces targets of opportunity, which fall into two categories: unscheduled targets and unanticipated targets. JP 3-60 emphasizes that while targets of opportunity may not be able to be processed through the exact same procedures as planned targets, commanders must still apply the same target development standards that they would in deliberate targeting. Specifically, “the same general standards for target intelligence diligence and rigor apply.”

Some other important terms that would be useful in assessing Hegseth’s actions in the Caribbean include time-sensitive targets and sensitive targets. Time-sensitive targets (TSTs) are targets — validated by a joint force commander — requiring immediate response due to their status as “highly lucrative, fleeting target[s] of opportunity.” The appropriate response for a TST is, per JP 3-60, “often dependent on the level of conflict, the clarity of the desired effect, and [rules of engagement].” Sensitive targets are defined as “targets for which planned actions warrant President or Secretary of Defense review and approval,” and their criteria are typically established by combatant commanders and delineated in plans, orders, and the rules of engagement (ROE).

The Joint Targeting Cycle

In JP 3-60, the purpose of joint targeting is “to create specific effects in the operational environment to meet commander’s objectives through the integration and synchronization of offensive capabilities.” The JTC is intended to be an iterative, flexible process, with adjustable time horizons and procedures to meet changing operational requirements.

The JTC is broken into six phases, carrying the targeting process through initial identification all the way through battle damage assessment. It is not intended to be “time constrained nor rigidly sequential,” with joint doctrine acknowledging that phases may need to be executed concurrently. At its core, the JTC is an “essential framework” to ensure that commanders have appropriate oversight, adequate intelligence has been collected, legal considerations have been raised, and proportional responses are executed.

While Congress has already started investigating Hegseth and his role in the strikes executed the first week of September 2025, there is still significant work that can be done regarding all the strikes the U.S. has conducted over the last few months. Congress can leverage the Joint Targeting Cycle to ask specific questions about established military doctrine, which helps limit Hegseth and the DOD’s ability to hide behind complex operational processes often unknown to civilians, where the truth can be obfuscated through acronyms and military lingo.

The following is an explanation of the phases of the Joint Targeting Cycle, as well as questions that Congress can and should ask of the Department of Defense to show how it planned and executed these strikes and what role senior officials played in the process.

Phase One: “Commander’s Objectives, Targeting Guidance, and Intent.”

This is where specifically the Joint Force Commander sets targeting priorities, establishes the criteria and procedures for designating time-sensitive targets, outlines the acquisition and identification criteria required from intelligence for a target, establishes authorized actions that may be taken against targets, and delegates responsibility for actions within the JTC. Objectives for targeting must be, according to doctrine, “clear, measurable, and achievable.”

Related questions Congress should ask:

• Who is serving as the Joint Force Commander (JFC) for operations in the Caribbean?
• Who is establishing the JTC for operations in the Caribbean?
• What commander is establishing objectives, per Phase One of the JTC? What are the objectives and how are you assessing if they are clear, measurable, and achievable?
• At any point have you had to compress or circumvent the JTC in order to prosecute a target in the Caribbean? If so, what phases or components of a phase were removed? What was your justification for doing so?

Phase Two: “Target Development and Prioritization.”

Those involved in the identification of targets and the planning of fires undergo “systematic examination of potential target systems and their components, individual targets, and even elements of targets to determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be exerted.” This phase includes the bulk of planning and preparatory work that goes into target development. It’s where the different staff components, like the intelligence professionals and the operational planners, come together and align their efforts. Notably, JP 3-60 does emphasize in its discussion of Phase Two that “a fully developed target must comply with national and command guidance, law of war, and the applicable ROE to be engaged.”

Related questions Congress should ask:

• At what staff level are you convening the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG) and Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) as part of Phase Two of the JTC?
• Which level of command holds responsibility for inputs and considerations from Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) throughout the JTC? What was their input to the JTCB for each strike?
• What is the target category for each of the strikes you have conducted in the Caribbean since September 1, 2025? Were they all scheduled targets? Were any designated as TSTs? If any targets were designated as TSTs, who was the defining authority for those engagements?
• Were any of the targeted vessels delineated as sensitive targets? Did the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Combatant Commander delineate them as sensitive targets? That authority typically rests with the appropriate combatant commander, so if that commandeer didn’t, then who did?
• Who established the ROE for operations in the Caribbean? Is there a separate ROE for the strikes? If so, who established it?
• When was each vessel nominated in the JTC? Were any high value individuals identified as operating or physically sitting on any of the vessels?
• What intelligence supported the classification of the vessels as combatants? Who determined that the vessels struck were lawful military objectives?
• At any point, was it found that the strikes were based on faulty intelligence? If so, did anyone recommend cancellation of a strike? Who? And if so, why wasn’t their recommendation followed?
• What intelligence asset(s) held target custody of the vessel? How long did you have target custody of the vessel?
• How many disciplines of intelligence did you use to determine affiliation with crime and narcotics? How many intelligence disciplines did you use to determine hostile act/hostile intent? At what phase of the operation did you determine hostile act/hostile intent, and what actions led to that determination?

Phase Three: “Capabilities Analysis.”

This phase consists of the evaluation of all the potential means by which a target could be engaged. This includes kinetic means (literally firing ordnance at a target) and non-kinetic means (psychological operations, electromagnetic interference, etc.).

Phase Four: “Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment.”

This is when “the process links theoretical planning to actual operations.” The commander will validate the analysis and planning that has gone into target selection and decide if it meets appropriate standards for execution.

Phase Five: “Mission Planning and Force Execution.”

In this phase, the target is prosecuted.

Phase Six: “Combat Assessment.”

Following the strike on a target, the effects of the hit are analyzed and assessed to see if they met the desired goals and whether the intended end state is met or if another cycle of targeting is required. A review of this phase would normally include an assessment of each missile fired, why it was fired, and whether it achieved its objective.

Legal Considerations in Targeting

In the ongoing politicization of the military, Hegseth and his senior leaders often hide behind dubious legal precedents and justification concealed in classified opinions. However, in the JTC, ensuring the legality of a target rests ultimately with the commander validating its selection, and that commander is advised by military lawyers, called Staff Judge Advocates (SJA). Throughout the targeting process, the SJA holds prioritized seats in the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG) and Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) — components of Phase 2 during which both the operational importance and legality of a target are considered. The legal considerations are so significant that within JP 3-60 they require their own standalone, seven-page appendix.

Per the doctrine, “it is DOD policy that members of DOD comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” It goes on to reinforce that “all targeting decisions must be made in light of the applicable ROE.” Legal considerations must also include protection for civilian populations and protected sites and objects. Ideally, those specific considerations are done by both the SJA and civil affairs planners.

JP 3-60 also includes a callout of lawful military attacks, stating that “military attacks will be directed only at military objectives.” It emphasizes that “military objective” is a treaty term, meaning it is established beyond just the bounds of U.S. code and is, in fact, recognized in international treaties we adhere to, such as the Geneva Convention. They are defined in the Geneva Convention and reiterated in JP 3-60 as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, under the circumstances ruling at that time, offers a definite military advantage.” The document continues, underscoring the use of the word “definite” to mean “a concrete and perceptible military advantage, rather than one that is merely hypothetical or speculative.” The appendix even accounts for situations in which a target may have been developed based on faulty intelligence, saying that “if it becomes apparent that a target is no longer a lawful military objective, the attack must be cancelled or suspended.”

The legal considerations involved in targeting are strongly established throughout JP 3-60, and it’s clear that anyone who willingly attempts to circumvent the necessary legal considerations is flagrantly disregarding established military doctrine. The role of the SJA is unquestionable, with the document emphatically acknowledging that “due to the complexity and extent of international law considerations involved in the joint targeting cycle,” a military lawyer must be available during every step of the JTC and consulted at all levels of command, specifically to ensure law of war compliance. To quote JP 3-60, “early involvement by the SJA will improve the targeting process and can prevent possible violations of international or domestic law.”

Documents

In addition to asking questions pertaining to the JTC and the strikes in the Caribbean, Congress should demand the following documents to help gather more information:

• Joint Force Commander’s Guidance and Objectives for strike operations
• Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operation Plans (OPLAN), and Operation Orders (OPORD) pertaining to all strike operations
• The established measures and indicators for assessing effects of each strike
• The products developed during the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) used to facilitate targeting for each strike
• The products developed during the target system analysis used to facilitate targeting for each strike
• The requirements established by the Joint Force Commander for target intelligence products for operations in the Caribbean, as well as all produced target intelligence products pertaining to the strikes
• The target development nomination (TDN) list, the candidate target list (CTL), the joint target list (JTL), the restricted target list (RTL), the target nomination list (TNL), the no-strike list (NSL), and the joint integrated prioritized target List (JIPTL)

Conclusion

Military doctrine is complex. The JTC is just one of seemingly endless joint publications that outline protocols and procedures for the world’s largest military. It is, in fact, so complex in the breadth of its requirements and execution that services have entire courses dedicated to instructing service members on how it functions.

The JTC’s role in military operations is innate and inarguable, to the point that if a commander — uniformed or civilian — attempts to circumvent or ignore it, there may be pushback and questions from among the ranks. And if it is mishandled or ignored, there is likely a paper trail associated with it.

Because Congress has, over the decades, ceded much of its war powers to the executive, it is already starting from behind. Couple that with a defense secretary who seems to be pushing the military into increasingly politicized territory, who criticizes those who question him, and Congress is left in a difficult position. But Congress can and should use the established policies of the JTC to its advantage in assessing the legalities and appropriateness of our ongoing operations in the Caribbean.